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BEYOND NEXUS: A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING K-12
TEACHER OFF-DUTY CONDUCT AND SPEECH IN ADVERSE
EMPLOYMENT AND LICENSURE PROCEEDINGS
John E.Rumel*
I. INTRODUCTION

Seldom does a week pass without the popular press reporting on
teacher off-duty conduct or speech that causes a stir in the local
community and triggers adverse employment or licensure consequences
for K-12 teachers. 1 In 2009, a Georgia teacher was forced to resign-an
employment consequence which was later upheld by a court-after a
parent objected to a photo she posted to Facebook showing her holding a
drink while on vacation in Europe and school officials concluded that
the posting "promoted alcohol use." 2 That same year, a Wisconsin
teacher was placed on leave for posting a photograph of herself looking
down the barrel of a rifle on her Facebook page. 3 And, in August 2011,
a Florida "Teacher of the Year" was terminated because he expressed
harsh views about gay marriage and same-sex unions. 4
Regarding a seemingly unrelated aspect of teacher conduct, educator
Charlotte Danielson wrote an influential work on teacher evaluation in
the mid-1990s entitled Enhancing ProfessionalPractice. A Framework
for Teaching.5 Through the use of various domains and rubrics,
Danielson developed an evaluative model which "identifies those
aspects of a teacher's responsibilities that have been documented
through empirical studies and theoretical research" as they specifically
* Associate Professor, University of Idaho College of Law; JD, University of California Hastings
College of Law, 1981; BA, University of California Santa Cruz, 1977. The author would like to thank
the 2014 Inland Northwest Scholars Conference, a joint endeavor of the University of Gonzaga School
of Law and the University of Idaho College of Law, where the author presented an early version of this
Article. The author also thanks his College of Law colleague Professor Wendy Gerwick Couture for
reading and commenting upon a prior draft of this Article and his former and current College of Law
research assistants, Melissa Jacobs and Patrick Fackrell, respectively, for their contributions to this
Article. The author is also grateful for the insightful feedback on the Article from Education Law
scholars Professors Todd DeMitchell and Susan Stuart. And, the author thanks the University of Idaho
College of Law for providing him with a summer research and writing stipend to financially support his
work on this Article.
1. See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, Teachers under a Morality Microscope, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 2,
2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/02/opinion/la-oe-turley-teachers-under-scrutiny-20120402.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. (1st ed. 1996). A Second Edition of Danielson's Framework was published in 2007.
CHARLOTTE DANIELSON, ENHANCING PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE: A FRAMEWORK FOR TEACHING (2d ed.

2007)
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related to improving student learning. 6 In so doing, Danielson took
important steps toward objectifying what had often been a highly
subjective aspect of administrator practice concerning teacher fitness
(and, perhaps later, school board and/or arbitral or judicial scrutiny of
that same issue).7
This Article does not intend to revisit Danielson's seminal work on
teacher evaluation. Indeed, it recognizes that Danielson's framework,
although addressing teacher professional responsibility, does not address
teacher off-duty behavior. The Article will, however, borrow from
Danielson conceptually as it addresses the above-mentioned issue of
significant importance to teachers and the communities they serve, i.e.
teacher off-duty conduct and speech and their relation to adverse
employment or licensure action against teachers. Specifically, the
Article will attempt to make two contributions to the existing
scholarship and judicial treatment concerning that topic: first, it will
discuss in detail the similar or parallel treatment which has been, and
should continue to be, utilized by the courts-particularly in the nexus
and relationship to work areas-in evaluating teacher off-duty conduct
and off-duty speech; and, second, it will propose a framework which
will likewise attempt to make more objective the current nexus standard
utilized by most states in evaluating teacher off-duty conduct and by the
Supreme Court in evaluating teacher off-duty speech as they both relate
to fitness to teach. 8
Part II of this Article will discuss the evolution of case law
concerning the regulation of teacher off-duty conduct and speech not
involving students where such behavior by teachers is arguably
unrelated to the teacher's employment. 9 In particular, Part II will focus
on the shift from an unadorned and vague "immorality" standard to the
development and adoption of a nexus requirement by most courts
concerning both teacher and/or public employee off-duty conduct and
speech as they pertain to teacher fitness.' 0 Part II will also explore the
strengths and weaknesses of the nexus standard, which requires proof
6. CHARLOTTE DANIELSON, THE FRAMEWORK FOR TEACHING EVALUATION INSTRUMENT 3

(2013).
7. See LAUREN SARTAIN, SARA RAY STOELINGA, & EMILY KRONE, RETHINKING TEACHER
EVALUATION: FINDINGS FROM THE FIRST YEAR OF THE EXCELLENCE IN TEACHING PROJECT IN
CHICAGO PUBLIC
SCHOOLS
1
(2010)
(internal
citation
omitted),
available at
https://ccsr.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Teacher/ 2OEval%2OFinal.pdf
8. The use of the term "teacher" is a short hand expression for professional and certificated
educator. As such, it includes all categories of professional and certificated K-1 2 educators, including
administrators (principals and vice-principals), classroom teachers, librarians, counselors and the like.
9. See infra notes 19-166 and accompanying text. The term "behavior" will likewise be a short
hand for both conduct and expression, the latter including speech, association and other forms of
expression.
10. Id.
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that a teacher's off-duty behavior makes them unfit to teach.11 In so
doing, it will conclude that, although the nexus standard constituted a
welcome and appropriate development delimiting the authority of school
boards and teacher licensing bodies to take adverse action against
teachers based on their off-duty conduct and speech, that same standard
continues to suffer from certain deficiencies that can be remedied by the
adoption of a framework for evaluating teacher off-duty behavior. 12 13
Part III of this Article will delineate that proposed framework.
Specifically, Part III will divide teacher off-duty conduct and speech
into two general categories, i.e., lawful off-duty conduct and speech and
unlawful off-duty conduct or unprotected speech. 14 It will conclude that
the former is presumptively not a basis for adverse employment or
licensure action against a teacher, while the latter causes mixed
employment or licensure results depending on, among other things, the
seriousness of the offense and the relationship (or lack thereof) of the
teacher's conduct or speech to their job responsibilities, their colleagues,
and the students in their charge. 15
Part IV of the Article will discuss the proposed framework in more
detail. 16 Specifically, Part IV will analyze the existing case law and
statutory authority relevant to each category of the proposed framework
and will discuss the rationale for proposing lesser or no employment or
licensing consequences for certain types of off-duty teacher conduct or
speech, while proposing harsher or permanent adverse employment or
licensing consequences for other, more objectionable off-duty
behavior. 17
Part V of the Article will conclude by suggesting that judicial
adoption of the proposed framework will augment the nexus standard
and properly protect teachers' off-duty conduct, associational and
speech rights, while still providing school districts and teacher licensing
boards authority to take adverse action against
teachers where their off18
duty behavior makes them unfit to teach.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See infra notes 167-73.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See infra notes 174-338.
17. Id.
18. See infra note 338 and accompanying text through the end of the Article. The framework
proposed in this Article addresses those circumstances where, either due to a statute, code of ethic
provision or contract, a school board or teacher licensing body must have cause-often referred to as
just or good cause-or some other legitimate basis for taking adverse employment or licensure action
against a teacher. It does not address or pertain to circumstances where a teacher-often a new or
probationary teacher-whose employment with a school district is at will or does not require cause to
not renew his or her teaching contract.
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II.

THE EVOLUTION OF CASE AUTHORITY CONCERNING THE
REGULATION OF TEACHERS' OFF-DUTY CONDUCT AND SPEECH
UNRELATED TO THEIR EMPLOYMENT

A. Conduct

1. Teachers as Exemplars/Role Models
During the early years of the Republic, community schools
throughout the colonies generally, but particularly in the North, were
predominantly
Protestant-controlled
or
Protestant-influenced
institutions. 19 As a result, teachers employed in those schools were
charged with inculcating Protestant values, including "religion, morality,
21
and knowledge" 20 and, specifically, "knowledge of the Scriptures.
From the later Colonial period and throughout the nineteenth century,
the common school movement precipitated a shift from sectarian to
secular/public education.22 During this period, teachers increasingly
were held to the standard of role model for the communities and
students that they served. 23

Thus, in the late-nineteenth century, the Illinois Appellate Court, in
upholding a school's termination of the employment contract of a
teacher charged with, among other things, immoral conduct, stated that
"[i]f suspicion of vice or immorality be once entertained against a
teacher, his influence for good is gone. The parents become distrustful,
the pupils contemptuous and the school discipline essential to success is
19. CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY,
1780-1860 3 (1983); LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, TRADITIONS OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 12-13 (1977);
JAMES W. FRASER,

BETWEEN CHURCH

AND

STATE: RELIGION

AND PUBLIC

EDUCATION IN

MULTICULTURAL AMERICA 47 (1999); Kent Greenawalt, Secularism, Religion and Liberal Democracy
in the United States, 30 CARDozo L. REV. 2383, 2387-88 (2009). For an informative pointcounterpoint discussion concerning the degree of Protestant control over Colonial period and nineteenth
century schools, see Kristin Shotwell, Secretly Falling in Love: America's Love Affair with Controlling
the Hearts and Minds of Public School Teachers, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 37, 37, 39-43 (2010) (characterizing
and emphasizing Colonial period and nineteenth century schools as "Protestant institutions" or "private
Protestant institutions"); but cf Todd A. DeMitchell, Immorality, TeacherPrivate Conduct, and Adverse
Notoriety: A Needed Recalculation of Nexus?, 40 J.L. & EDUC. 327, 329-31 (2011) (agreeing with
Shotwell that early period schools were "Protestant-influenced," but disagreeing that they were
"Protestant institutions" and emphasizing secular influences on schools during that time period).
20. FRASER, supra note 19, at 23 (quoting the Northwest Ordinance Sec. 14, art. 3 (1787)).
21. Id. at 10 (quoting the Old Deluder Satan Act of 1647 adopted by the Massachusetts Colony).
22. lan Burtrum, The Political Origins of Secular Public Education: The New York School
Controversy, 1840-1842, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 267, 271-85 (2008), citing JOEL SPRING, THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL 1642-1993 (3d ed. 1994).
23. DAVID B. TYACK & ELISABETH HARISOT, MANAGERS OF VIRTUE: PUBLIC SCHOOL
LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA, 1820-1980 174 (1982), cited in Trebilcock, Off Campus: School Board
Control over Teacher Conduct, 35 TULSA L. J. 445, 448 (2000) and Todd A. DeMitchell, Private Lives:
Community Control vs. ProfessionalAutonomy, 78 ED. L. REP. 187, 190 (1993).
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at an end.",24 Around that same time, the Missouri Court of Appeals
upheld the dismissal of a teacher who was accused by his wife of
various acts of adultery, stating that:
There may be causes for the removal of a teacher affecting the
discipline of the school over which he presides, entirely outside of
any question of his learning, ability, power of enforcing discipline,
or moral qualities, and outside of his own acts. As in the present
instance. It was not for the board of directors to prejudge, or even
to examine, the charges brought against this teacher by his wife;
but the mere fact that charges of this character were brought
against him, and that the fact had become notorious, rendered it
highly inexpedient that he should remain as a teacher of higher
classes frequented by youths between the ages of fourteen and
twenty. It is unnecessary to dwell upon this. Such would be the
common sense of all fathers and mothers having a parental regard
for the morals of their children.25
Moving into the twentieth century, "[t]he nineteenth century idea of
the teacher as a public figure and role model eventually became codified
in statutes and administrative codes.
,,26 In addition to these statutory
and regulatory provisions, school districts occasionally inserted moral
clauses in employment contracts with teachers. 27 By the mid-twentieth
century, virtually all states granted power to state boards of education to
suspend or revoke a teacher's certificate based on immoral conduct,
moral turpitude, or conduct unbecoming of a teacher. 28 Likewise, under
a number of state statutes, that same immoral behavior could also
constitute sufficient cause for terminating the employment contract of or
suspending tenured teachers or teachers under contracts for a fixed

24. Tingley v. Vaughn, Ill.
App. 347, 351 (1885).
25. McLellan v. Bd. of Presidents, etc. of Pub. Schs. of St. Louis, 1884 WL 9294, 15 Mo. App.
362, 365-66 (1884).
26. Shotwell, supra note 19, at 54.
27. Marka B. Fleming, Amanda Harmon Cooley & Gwendolyn McFadden-Wade, Morals
Clausesfor Educators in Secondary and PostsecondarySchools: Legal Implications and Constitutional
Concerns, 2009 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L. J.67, 80 ("[T]hese employment conditions [were] supplementary to
or reflective of the governing state's statutory scheme or a state administrative agency's regulatory
structure that imposes certain implied morals requirements on all secondary school teachers."). Indeed,
those schemes and structures often impose express morals requirements and apply to primary school
teachers as well. See infra notes 28 and 29 and statutory provisions listed therein.
28. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.030(a)(2) (2008); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44421 (2007); FLA.
STAT. § 1012.795(1)(d) (2008); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-23(a) (2008); IND. CODE § 20-28-5-7(1)
(2008); KAN. STAT. § 72-1383 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-42-9 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE §
28A.410.090(1) (2008); W. VA. CODE § 18A-3-6 (2007); WYO. STAT. § 21-2-802(c) (2007) (cited in
Fleming et al., supra note 27, at 72 n.26 and accompanying text); see also Shotwell, supranote 19, at 54
n. 142 and accompanying text.
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term.29
Although certainly applicable to a teacher's on-duty immoral conduct,
30
such as improper relationships or interactions with students at school,
statutory and regulatory moral provisions, as well as morals clauses in
teaching contracts, had and continue to have a significant, if not greater,
application concerning teacher off-duty conduct. 31 Two scholars have
pointed out that "[e]vidence abounds that townspeople kept a vigilant
eye on the out-of-class behavior of educators, and that the moral 'lapses'32
resulted in firings more often than did incompetence in the classroom."
Thus, because of their exemplar status in the communities they served,
teachers were not allowed to court or marry in some parts of the
country. 33 In addition, "activities [such] as dancing, smoking, drinking,
divorce, marriage, dating and pregnancy were looked at askance by
school authorities and frequently any indulgence in these activities
brought about disciplinary action." 34 One teacher explained during the
1930s that "[h]ow I conduct my classes seems to be of no great interest
to the school authorities, but 3what
I do when school is not in session
5
concerns them tremendously.
29. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-24-8 (2008); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44427 (2007); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 22-63-301 (2007); DEL. CODE tit. 14 §§ 1411, 1420 (2008); GA. CODE § 20-2-940(a)(4) (2007);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-609 (2008); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-22.4 (2008); IND. CODE § 20-28-7l(a)(1) (2008); KY. REv. STAT. § 156.132(B)(1) (2008); LA. REV. STAT. § 17:443(A) (2008); MD. CODE
EDUC. § 6-202(a)(1)(i) (2008); NEv. REV. STAT. § 391.312 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § l15C325(e)(1)(b) (2007); OHIO. REv. CODE § 3319.16 (2008); 24 PA. STAT. § 11-1122(a) (2007); S.C. CODE
§ 59-25-430 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-43-6.1 (2008); TENN. CODE § 49-5-51 1(a)(2) (2008);
VT. STAT. tit. 16 § 1752 (2007); VA. CODE § 22.1-307(A) (2008); WIS. STAT. § 118.23(3) (2007); Wyo.
STAT. § 21-7-110(a) (2007) (cited in Fleming et al., supra note 27, at 72 n.8).
30. See, e.g., Gover v. Stovall, 35 S.W.2d 24, 25-26 (Ct. App. 1931) (where teacher was in
school building at night with another man and three young women one of whom was a pupil in the
school, keeping the lights off and the meeting a secret for several days, teacher's dismissal was upheld
because his conduct invited criticism and produced suspicions of immorality), superseded by statute as
stated in Bd. of Educ. of Fayette v. Hurley-Richards, 396 S.W.3d 879, 885 n.8 (Ky. 2013); Clarke v. Bd.
of Educ., 338 N.W.2d 272, 273, 278 (1983) (teacher's use of racial epithet directed at black students in a
racially-mixed classroom constitute "immorality" under state statute sufficient to justify immediate
termination).
3 1. See DeMitchell, supra note 23, at 190 n.22 and accompanying text; see also Shotwell, supra
note 19; Ruth L. Davison, John L. Strope, Jr. & Donald F. Uerling, The PersonalLives and Professional
Responsibilities of P-12 Educators: Off-Duty Conduct as Groundsfor Adverse Employment Acton, 171
ED. L. REP. 691 (2003); Jason R. Fulmer, Dismissingthe "'Immoral" Teacherfor Conduct Outside the
Workplace-Do CurrentLaws Protect the Interests of Both School Authorities and Teachers? 31 J.L. &
EDUC. 271, 284 (2002); Clifford P, Hooker, Terminating Teachers and Revoking their Licensure for
Conduct Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate, 96 ED. L. REP. 1 (1995).
32. Tyack & Hansot, supra note 23, at 174.
33. MARY HURLBUT CORDIER, SCHOOL WOMEN OF THE PRAIRIES AND PLAINS 34 (1992)

(quoted in Shotwell, supra note 19 at 52); see also Backie v. Cromwell Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 133, 242
N.W. 389, 390-92 (Minn. 1932) (court upheld teacher termination under School Board policy granting
Board discretion to nullify single female teachers' contracts upon marriage).
34. DeMitchell, supra note 23, at 190.
35. HOWARD K. BEALE, ARE AMERICAN TEACHERS FREE? AN ANALYSIS OF RESTRAINTS UPON
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In a well-known Pennsylvania case from that time period,36 a local
school board, relying on a statute allowing for the termination of a
teacher's contract for immorality, incompetency, or intemperance,
dismissed a teacher whose husband owned a restaurant across the street
from the school after the teacher was observed by her students several
times drinking beer, playing pinball, and shaking dice with customers at
the restaurant.37 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reinstated the trial
court's order upholding the school board's decision, initially stating as
follows:
If the fact be that she "now commands neither the respect nor the
good will of the community" and if the record shows that effect to
be the result of her conduct ...it will be conclusive evidence of

incompetency. It has always been the recognized duty of the
teacher to conduct himself in such way as to command the respect
and good will of the community, though one result of the choice of
a teacher's vocation may be to deprive him of the same freedom of
action enjoyed by persons in other vocations. Educators have
always regarded the example set by the teacher as of great
importance, particularly in the education of the children in the
lower grades such as those attending the school in which this
teacher had been employed.
38
The Pennsylvania high court continued by defining the statutory
terms broadly, concluding that: (1) immorality was not confined to
sexual immorality, but would include "any course of conduct as offends
the morals of the community and is a bad example to the youth whose
ideals a teacher is supposed to foster and to elevate; '39 (2) intemperance
was not limited "strictly to overindulgence in alcoholic liquors;" 40 and
(3) "incompetency as a teacher" was not limited to "the [in]ability to
teach the 'Three R's. ' '' 4 1 Applying these broad definitions, the court

concluded by agreeing with the trial court's decision that the teacher had
engaged in immoral conduct while frequenting the restaurant, thereby
rendering her incompetent as a teacher.42
THE FREEDOM OF TEACHING IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 395 (1936).

36. Horosko v. Sch. Dist. of Mount Pleasant Twp. 6 A.2d 866 (Pa. 1939).
37. Id. at 867-68.
38. Id. at 868.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 869.
The Court, citing to both standard and legal dictionaries, stated that
"incompetency" had been defined variously as "lack of...
fitness to discharge the required duty," "want
of ...
fitness," and "[g]eneral lack of capacity of fitness." Id. at 869-70. The Court, however, did not
expressly require any connection between the teacher's conduct and lack of fitness to teach.
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Similarly, in Scott v. Board of Education of Alton Community Unit

School Dist. No.11, 43 a teacher was arrested for public intoxication on
several occasions. 4 Although apparently no convictions had occurred
and the teacher denied the charges, the school board terminated her
contract for cause on the statutory ground that the interests of the school
required such action.45 An Illinois appellate court upheld the school
board's decision, finding and concluding that:
... a teacher is something of a leader to pupils of tender age,
resulting in admiration and emulation, and that the Board might
properly fear the effect of social conduct in public, not in keeping
with the dignity and leadership they desired from teachers.
Therefore, the decision was not without foundation, nor contrary to
the manifest weight of the evidence, and this court cannot hold the
decision should be set aside. 46
Likewise, in Sullivan v. Meade Independent School Dist. No. 101,47 a

school board terminated the employment of an unmarried female teacher
after it became known that she was living together with a man in a
dwelling within the school district boundaries. 48 The teacher brought
suit against the school district and its board of trustees alleging that the
termination violated her constitutional rights. 49 The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals disagreed, rejecting the teacher's constitutional
arguments and finding that:
... the Board had before it evidence that Ms. Sullivan's

conduct violated local mores, that her students were aware of this,
and that, because of the size of the town, this awareness would
continue. The Board considered the unrefuted testimony of a
professional educator that teachers teach by example as well as by
lecture. Ms. Sullivan was shown to have generated deep affection
from her students, increasing the probability of emulation. Also, it
was shown that because of the isolation of Union Center, students
are required to leave home at age 14 to attend high school in
Sturgis, some 60 miles away. Thus, local parents believe that early
proper moral training for youngsters is particularly crucial in

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

156 N.E.2d 1 (111.App. 1959).
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3.
530 F.2d 799 (8th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 801-02.
Id. at 801.
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50

And, in Brown v. Bathke,5 1 a federal district court judge upheld a
school board's termination of a teacher based on the teacher having
become pregnant out-of-wedlock. 52 In so holding, the judge found and
concluded that the teacher was a role model for her students and that the
school district's interest in its teachers maintaining that status
outweighed the constitutional considerations asserted by the teacher:
The evidence is persuasive that a junior high school teacher who
develops a good relationship with the students is likely to be a
model to those students in wide-ranging respects, including
personal values. The plaintiff had developed such a relationship
with the students. Many of them knew that she was not married;
some of them by April, 1973, had observed that she probably was
pregnant and some had asked her about it, but she had given them
no definitive answer. Under those circumstances, the board of
education was within the realm of propriety in considering that its
permitting the plaintiff to continue to teach would be viewed by the
students as a condonation by the plaintiff and the school board of
pregnancy out of wedlock. There is a rational connection between
the plaintiffs pregnancy out of wedlock and the school board's
interest in conserving marital values...
Fully considered, I conclude that the interests of the plaintiff in
determining her own familial relationships and associating with
whom she chooses do not outweigh the interests of the school in
providing the kind of teachers it chooses for imparting social
values and educational subject matter to junior high school
students. 53
The above-discussed judicial decisions balanced the interests of
schools, patrons and the local communities that they served against the
privacy and associational rights of teachers in a way that substantially
favored the schools and their constituents over the teachers whom they
employed. In other words, very little weight was placed on the teachers'
side of the scale. However, the judicially-spawned "Rights Revolution"
of the late-1960s and early-1970s signaled increases in the property,
50. Id. at 804.
51. 416 F. Supp. 1194 (D. Neb. 1976), rev'don other grounds, 566 F.2d 588 (8th Cit. 1977).
52. Id. at 1196-1200.
53. Id. at 1198 and 1200. The Eighth Circuit reversed on procedural due process grounds,
Bathke v. Brown, 566 F.2d 588, 591-93 (8th Cir. 1977), but did not address the legal sufficiency of the
Board's reasons for terminating the teacher's contract.
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liberty, privacy, speech and associational rights of individuals in the
public employment setting and elsewhere, as well as a concomitant
reduction in the power of the government to deprive public employees
and other individuals of those same rights.54 For teachers, this shift
toward greater recognition of employee rights in the workplace
manifested itself most notably in the judicial recognition of rights in
three areas: property and procedural due process rights in public
employment; speech rights related to matters of public concern; 56 and
the adoption of a nexus standard in termination and/or licensure matters.
It is to the nexus requirement that this Article will now turn.
2. The Nexus Requirement
In Morrison v. State Board of Education,57 the California Supreme
Court took up the issue of whether a state board of education could take
adverse action against a teacher's professional license when the teacher
engaged in legal conduct which the board considered immoral and
unprofessional under state law.58 In Morrison, the teacher (Morrison)
engaged in noncriminal homosexual conduct 59 with a male colleague
(Schneringer) for a short period of time-four times in one week-when
Schneringer and his wife were having marital and financial
difficulties. 60 Morrison had not engaged in similar conduct before-and
did not engage in similar conduct after-the encounter with his
colleague. 61 Schneringer eventually reported the conduct to the School
District superintendent and, as a result, Morrison resigned from
employment. 62 Almost two years later, the State Board of Education
(SBE) brought charges against Morrison and sought to revoke his
54. See Daniel F. Piar, A Welfare State of Civil Rights: the Triumph of the Therapeutic in
American ConstitutionalLaw, 16 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J., 649, 659-72 (2008) (Contrasted
with Protestant culture, "[t]he 'rights revolution' ... has ostensibly expanded individual freedoms.
Persons, activities, and interests that once were suppressed or punished now receive the full protection
of law."); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE (1990).

55. See Trebilcock, supra note 23, at 449-50, discussing seminal Supreme Court procedural due
process decisions in the educational employment setting in Roth v. Bd. of Regents, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)
and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
56. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
57. 461 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1969).
58. Id. at 377.
59. Id. at 377-78. Morrison was neither charged with nor convicted of sodomy, oral copulation
or lewd conduct-each of which was a felony in California at the time and conviction of any of which
would have led to "mandatory" and "automatic" revocation of a teaching certificate under California
law. See id. at 378 n.6.
60. Id. at 377.
61. Id. at 377-78.
62. Id. at 378.
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teaching certificates on the grounds that Morrison's conduct constituted
immoral and unprofessional conduct and moral turpitude under
California statutory law.63 After a hearing, the SBE revoked Morrison's
certificates on those grounds. 64 The trial court refused to grant Morrison
a writ of mandate compelling the SBE to set aside its decision and
restore his teaching certificates.65
The California Supreme Court reversed.66 The Court, after discussing
previous California, federal, and out-of-state cases interpreting
provisions similar or identical to those under which Morrison had been
charged,67 held "that the Board of Education cannot abstractly

characterize the conduct in this case as 'immoral,' 'unprofessional,' or
'involving moral turpitude' within the meaning of section 13202 of the
Education Code unless that conduct indicates that the petitioner is unfit
to teach. 6 8
Simultaneously applying principles of due process and statutory
interpretation, the Court first justified its narrowing interpretation of the
California statute as follows:
By interpreting these broad terms to apply to the employee's
performance on the job, the [prior judicial] decisions. . . give
content to language which otherwise would be too sweeping to be
meaningful. Terms such as "immoral or unprofessional conduct" or
"moral turpitude" stretch over so wide a range that they embrace
an unlimited area of conduct. In using them the Legislature surely
did not mean to endow the employing agency with the power to
63. Id. at 378-79. In Morrison, teaching licenses or certificates were referred to as "life
diplomas." Id., (citing CAL. EDUC.CODE § 13202).
64. Id. at 378-79.
65. Id. at 377.
66. Id. at 395.
67. Id. at 379-85 (citing, inter alia, Hallinan v. Comm. of Bar Exam'rs, 421 P.2d 375 (1966);
Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Jarvella v. Willoughby-Eastlake City Sch. Dist.,
233 N.E.2d 143 (1967)).
68. Id. at 386. The Court painted further gloss on the newly-enunciated standard, stating that:
In determining whether the teacher's conduct thus indicates unfitness to teach the board may
consider such matters as the likelihood that the conduct may have adversely affected students or
fellow teachers, the degree of such adversity anticipated, the proximity or remoteness in time of
the conduct, the type of teaching certificate held by the party involved, the extenuating or
aggravating circumstances, if any, surrounding the conduct, the praiseworthiness or
blameworthiness of the motives resulting in the conduct, the likelihood of the recurrence of the
questioned conduct, and the extent to which disciplinary action may inflict an adverse impact or
chilling effect upon the constitutional rights of the teacher involved or other teachers. These
factors are relevant to the extent that they assist the board in determining a teacher's fitness to
teach, i.e., in determining whether the teacher's future classroom performance and overall impact
on his students are likely to meet the board's standards.
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dismiss any employee whose personal, private conduct incurred its
disapproval. Hence the courts have consistently related the terms to
the issue of whether, when applied to the performance of the
employee on the job, the employee has disqualified himself.
In the instant case the terms denote immoral or unprofessional
conduct or moral turpitude of the teacher which indicates unfitness
to teach. Without such a reasonable interpretation the terms would
be susceptible to so broad an application as possibly to subject to
discipline virtually every teacher in the state. In the opinion of
many people laziness, gluttony, vanity, selfishness, avarice, and
cowardice constitute immoral conduct. 9
The Court, pointing to the shifting and varied meaning of morality
and the arguably more workable concept of fitness to teach, further
explained:
Nor is it likely that the Legislature intended ...to establish a

standard for the conduct of teachers that might vary widely with
time, location, and the popular mood. One could expect a
reasonably stable consensus within the teaching profession as to
what conduct adversely affects students and fellow teachers. No
such consensus can be presumed about "morality." "Today's
morals may be tomorrow's ancient and absurd customs." And
conversely, conduct socially acceptable today may be anathema
tomorrow. Local boards of education, moreover, are authorized to
revoke their own certificates and dismiss permanent teachers for
immoral

and

unprofessional

conduct ...an

overly

broad

interpretation of that authorization could result in disciplinary
action in one county for conduct treated as permissible in
another ....
A more constricted interpretation of "immoral,"
"unprofessional," and "moral turpitude" avoids these difficulties,
enabling the State Board of Education to utilize its expertise in
educational matters rather than having to act "as the prophet to
which is revealed the state of morals of the people or the common
conscience. 7 °
And, the Court rejected contentions raised by Morrison concerning
the constitutionality of the above-discussed Education Code provisions,
concluding that the narrowing interpretation placed on those terms saved

69. Id. at 382-83 & n. 15, (citing Robert N. Harris, Jr., Note, Private Consensual Adult Behavior:
The Requirement of Harm to Others in the Enforcement of Morality, 14 UCLA L. REV. 581, 582
(1967)).
70. Id. at 383-84 (citations omitted).
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73
72
them from running afoul of due process 7 1 and privacy concerns.

The Court next restated and refined the newly-enunciated nexus
standard, for the first time raising notoriety considerations and framing
the question before the Court as follows:
... [T]he statutes, properly interpreted, provide that the [SBE] can
revoke a life diploma or other document of certification and thus
prohibit local school officials from hiring a particular teacher only

if that individual has in some manner indicated that he is unfit to
teach. Thus an individual can be removed from the teaching
profession only upon a showing that his retention in the profession
poses a significant danger of harm to either students, school

employees, or others who might be affected by his actions as a
teacher .... Petitioner's conduct in this case is not disputed.
Accordingly, we must inquire whether any adverse inferences can
be drawn from that past conduct as to petitioner's teaching ability,
or as to the possibility that publicity surrounding past conduct may
in and of itself substantially impair his function as a teacher. 74
Applying the refined standard and several of the factors identified
previously, 75 the Court found there was no evidence in the record to
support a determination that Morrison was unfit to teach.76 In particular,
the Court pointed to the lack of any expert testimony suggesting that
71. Id. at 387-90 ("This construction [requiring proof of a nexus between immoral conduct and
fitness to teach] gives section 13202 the required specificity. Teachers, particularly in the light of their
professional expertise, will normally be able to determine what kind of conduct indicates unfitness to
teach.").
72. Id. at 390-91 ("By limiting the application of... section 13202 to conduct shown to indicate
unfitness to teach, we substantially reduce the incentive to inquire into the private lives of otherwise
sound and competent teachers.").
73. Morrison also argued that the SBE decision could not stand "because his questioned conduct
[did] not rationally relate to his duties as a teacher." Id. at 391. The Court, relying on substantive due
process and First Amendment case law, rejected Morrison's argument-again on the grounds that its
narrowing construction of section 13202 remedied this potential infirmity. Id. at 391.
74. Id. at 391 (citations omitted). Significantly influenced by the California Supreme Court's
decision in Morrison, a majority of courts has adopted the nexus standard in evaluating actions against a
teacher's certificate by a state educational agency based on allegations of immorality, unprofessional
conduct, conduct unbecoming a teacher and the like and adverse employment actions against teachers
on the same grounds by school districts. See Robinson v. Ohio Dep't of Educ., 971 N.E.2d 977, 985
(Ohio App. 2 Dist. 2012); Lehto v. Bd. of Educ., 962 A.2d 222, 226-27 & nn.14 and 17 (Del. 2008);
Alford v. Ingram, 931 F. Supp. 768, 772-73 (M.D. Ala. 1996); Thompson v. Sw. Sch. Dist., 483
F.Supp. 1170, 1181 (W.D.Mo. 1980); Winters v. Ariz. Bd. of Educ., 83 P.3d 1114, 1119 (Kan. Ct. App.
2004) Weissman v. Bd. of Educ., 547 P.2d 1267, 1272-73 (Colo. 1976); Hainline v. Bond, 824 P.2d
959, 967 (Kan. 1992); Clark v. Ann Arbor Sch. Dist., 681, 344 N.W.2d 48 (Mich. App. 1983); Ross v.
Robb, 662 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Mo. 1983); Erb v. Iowa State Bd. of Public Instruction, 216 N.W.2d 339,
343 (1974); Barringer v. Caldwell Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 373, 473 S.E.2d 435, 439 (N.C. App. 1996);
Powell v. Paine, 655 S.E.2d 204, 209 (W. Va. 2007); see also Fulmer, supra note 31, at 284.
75. See Morrison, 461 P.2d at 386.
76. Id. at 391-92.
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Morrison posed a risk of harm to students, the lack of evidence
indicating that Morrison's encounters with Schneringer diminished his
(Morrison's) ability to effectively teach students and maintain good
relations with his co-workers, and the relative lack of notoriety that the
events had engendered. 77

In sum, the California Supreme Court's adoption of the nexus
standard in its seminal Morrison decision signaled a major shift from the
role model/exemplar rationale concerning evaluation and scrutiny of
teacher off-duty conduct. 78 This Article will next explore a similar shift
in the area of teacher off-duty speech, expressive conduct and
association.
B. Speech andExpressive Conduct/Association
1. The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine/Rights-Privilege
Distinction and Teachers as Role Models/Exemplars
Late-nineteenth through mid-twentieth century cases involving the
dismissal of teachers for off-duty speech and association were premised
on the notion that, because public employment was a privilege, states
and school districts could place conditions on a teacher's continued
employment by imposing limits on their constitutional speech and
associational rights, subject only to the limitation that the conditions
were reasonable. 79 Thus, in upholding the dismissal of teachers for their
77. Id.
78. See Davison et. al supra note 31 at 704. This is not to say, however, that the judicial view of
teachers as role models or exemplars disappeared from the legal landscape. The Supreme Court, in the
late 1970s stated that "a teacher serves as a role model for his students, exerting a subtle but important
influence over their perceptions and values." Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1979). Indeed,
in 2011, the California Court of Appeal, applying Morrison, stated that " '[a] teacher ...in the public
school system is regarded by the public and pupils in the light of an exemplar, whose words and actions
are likely to be followed by the [students] coming under [his] care and protection."' San Diego Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Comm'n on Prof I Competence, 194 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1463-64 (2011) (quoting Board of
Trustees v. Stubblefield, 16 Cal.App.3d 820, 824 (1971)) (ellipsis in original). And, as recently as 2014,
a federal magistrate judge, upholding the dismissal of a teacher based on off-duty conduct, stated that
"while plaintiffs conduct outside the workplace may not have jeopardized the safety of her students or
affected her ability to help students reach their educational goals, her actions not only created negative
publicity, but compromised her ability to serve as a role model." DePrima v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Educ., No.
12 CV 3626(MKB)(LB), 2014 WL 1159, at *10 n.18 (ED.N.Y.2014), adopted as modified in 2014
WL 1155282 (E.D. N.Y. 2014). It is just that the vast majority of courts, when faced with a choice
between evaluating teacher off-duty conduct under a role model standard derived from a statutory
morals provision or under a nexus standard, has opted for the nexus standard. See, e.g., Thompson v.
Wis. Dept. of Pub. Instruction, 541 N.W.2d 182, 186-87 (Wisc. App. 1995).
79. Adler v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y.C., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952), (cited in Constitutional
Protection of Substantive Rights, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1065 n.l (1968); Note, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595, 1595 (1960)) ("Conditioning the extension of a governmental
benefit or 'privilege' upon the surrender of constitutional rights has long appealed to Congress and the

2015]

EVALUATING K-12 TEACHER OFF-DUTY CONDUCT

699

off-duty speech and associational activities, both the United States and
the Pennsylvania Supreme Courts relied on then-Judge (later Justice)
Holmes's pithy dictum in an 1892 case concerning another group of
public employees, stating that "[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman., 8 0 Or, as stated by one noted constitutional scholar, the
rights-privilege distinction in public employment was "a specific
application of the larger
view that no one has a constitutional right to
' 81
largess."
government
An early decision involving the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine/rights-privilege distinction in the teacher off-duty speech and
association context occurred in McDowell v. Board of Education of City
of New York.82 There, the teacher (McDowell), having been called
before the local school board, informed the board that because she was a
Quaker, she opposed the United States' ongoing hostilities with
Germany during World War 1.83
The board then terminated
McDowell's employment, determining that her beliefs constituted
84
conduct unbecoming of a teacher under New York statutory law.
Rejecting McDowell's constitutional challenges to her dismissal, the
trial court upheld the board's decision.85 The court squarely held that a
teacher's expression of her religious beliefs, occurring outside of the
classroom and not directed at students, could serve as the basis for
dismissal, stating as follows:
The petitioner asserts that she was not guilty of any misbehavior or
misconduct within the meaning of the statute. She says that her
offense, if any, was to disclose the state of her mind, her beliefs,
and that there is no element of behavior or conduct in a mere
belief. She claims the board of education should not have
condemned her until her beliefs had been translated into action in
the classroom.
This contention is unsound... . [T]he petitioner was charged with
entertaining certain beliefs and declaring certain intentions that
may very well be regarded as clearly showing her to be both
incompetent and inefficient as a teacher ....The substance of the
state legislatures as a means of regulating private conduct.").
80. McAuliffe v. Mayor of City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) (cited in Adler,
342 U.S. at 492).
81. William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439, 1442 (1968).
82. 172 N.Y.S. 590 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1918).
83. Id. at 591.
84. Id. at 591-92.
85. Id. at 592-93.
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finding of the board of education is that the petitioner is unfit to
remain a teacher in our public schools, and this court will not,
under 86the circumstances, undertake to say that the board is in
error.

The Court concluded by making clear that a teacher's beliefs and
speech, like his or her conduct, could serve as a basis for dismissal by
undermining the teacher's status as a role model:
The contention that the petitioner, in spite of her views, may still
be able to do her full duty as a teacher in the classroom cannot be
upheld. The grounds of removal contemplated by the statute may
in a given instance be wholly unrelated to the discharge of the
scholastic duties, and a teacher may be both incompetent and
inefficient, even though her class shows most gratifying results in
the ordinary subjects of the curriculum. It is of the utmost
importance to the state that the association of teacher and pupil
should tend to inculcate in the latter principles of justice and
patriotism and a respect for our laws. This end cannot be
accomplished, if the pupil finds his teacher unwilling to submit to
constituted authority. 87
Similarly, in State ex rel. Schweitzer v. Turner,88 a teacher made
public statements that he was a pacifist and would not serve the United
States government and military in any way during World War 11. 8 9
Upon learning this information, the school board terminated the
teacher's employment under a statutory provision allowing for removal
90
of teachers for, among other things, immorality or incompetency.
Without discussing First Amendment speech concerns and
acknowledging "that, professionally," the teacher (Turner) was "well
qualified, conscientious, and experienced and [was] highly esteemed in
Dade County," 91 the Florida Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's
decision upholding the School Board's termination decision. 92 Again
stressing the need for teachers to "inculcate" values to students by
example, the Florida high court stated that state statutory law made it
the duty of a teacher to labor faithfully and earnestly for the
advancement of the pupils in their duties, deportment and morals,

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 592.
Id. at 592.
19 So.2d 832 (Fla. 1944).
Id. at 832.
Id. at 832-33.
Id. at 832.
Id. at 834.
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and embrace every opportunity to inculcate by precept and
example the principles of truth, honesty and patriotism and the
practice of every Christian virtue. It was the conclusion of the
[school board]
that the conduct and attitude of the appellant
was not only inimical to the responsibilities of good citizenship,
but his manifested ideals were detrimental to 93
the minds of the
system.
school
public
the
of
welfare
and
students
The Court concluded that the school board had correctly decided that
the teacher's beliefs caused him to be incompetent to be a teacher,
stating as follows:
The Statute... imposed the duty to teach the students of Dade
County by precept and example "honesty and patriotism," and the
true test of patriotism, can accurately be measured by the
willingness of the citizen to bear arms and fight in the defense of
his Country. The relator's qualifications, as clearly manifested by
the record, failed to conform with the requirements of our law and
the respondent Board's conclusions are within the spirit of the
law..., when by resolutions adopted the appellant was declared
incompetent to teach in the public schools ...
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine/rights-privilege distinction,
insofar as it concerned public employment and, specifically, public
school teaching, reached its apogee in the 1950s. During that time
period, the United States Supreme Court upheld potential or actual
teacher dismissals based on off-duty speech or associational activities in
two cases: Adler v. Board of Educationof City of New York 95 and Beilan
v. Board of Higher Education.96 In Adler, New York City school
teacher Irving Adler brought a declaratory relief action challenging the
constitutionality of a New York statute making ineligible for
employment as a public school teacher any person advocating, or
belonging to organizations advocating, overthrow of government by
force, violence or unlawful means. 97 The Supreme Court rejected
Adler's challenge, first articulating the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine that had held jurisprudential sway in the public employment
setting for many years:
It is clear that such persons [employed or seeking employment in
the public schools] have the right under our law to assemble,
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 833.
Id. at 833-34.
342 U.S. 485 (1952).
357 U.S. 399 (1958).
342 U.S. at486-91.
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speak, think and believe as they will.... It is equally clear that

they have no right to work for the State in the school system on
their own terms.... If they do not choose to work on such terms,

they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and go
elsewhere. Has the State thus deprived them of any right to free
speech or assembly? We think not.98
The Court went on to bolster its decision by noting the significant
impact that teachers have on the development of students' attitude and
values, stating as follows:
A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There he
shapes the attitude of young minds towards the society in which
they live. In this, the state has a vital concern. It must preserve the
integrity of the schools. That the school authorities have the right
and the duty to screen the officials, teachers, and employees as to
their fitness to maintain the integrity of the schools as a part of
ordered society, cannot be doubted. One's associates, past and
present, as well as one's conduct, may properly be considered in
determining fitness and loyalty. From time immemorial, one's
reputation has been determined in part by the company he keeps.
In the employment of officials and teachers of the school system,
the state may very properly inquire into the company they keep,
and we know of no rule, constitutional or otherwise, that prevents
the state, when determining the fitness and loyalty of such persons,
from considering the organizations and persons with whom they
associate. 99

Likewise, in Beilan, the Court was faced with a constitutional
challenge by a teacher in Philadelphia who had been dismissed from
employment by a school board on the ground of incompetency based on
his refusal to answer any questions concerning his past affiliation with
the Communist party. 10 0 The Court rejected the teacher's challenge,
disingenuously framing the case as one involving insubordination, rather
than association and disloyalty. 101 The Court then quoted both the Adler
98. Id. at 492.
99. Id. at 493.
100. 357 U.S. at 400-03.
101. Id. at 404. One commentator noted that the Court's willingness in Beilan and other cases to
allow public employers to fire employees based on their being "insubordinate" when refusing to answer
questions about their affiliations with alleged subversive organizations constituted "disingenuous
thinking." Note, Loyalty Oaths, 77 YALE L.J. 739, 765 (1968). More recently, a respected teacher
speech scholar pointed out that the Court majority's decision to frame the issue as involving the ability
of a school board to dismiss Beilan for insubordination, rather than for exercising his associational
rights, allowed the Court to avoid inquiry into First Amendment and academic freedom issues. Scott R.
Bauries, Individual Academic Freedom: An Ordinary Concern of the FirstAmendment, 83 Miss. L.J.
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court's statement about the role of teachers in developing the minds of
impressionable students10 2 and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
statement in Horosko concerning the effect of teacher conduct on his or
her ability to maintain the respect and03 goodwill of the community while
serving as a role model for students. 1
2. The Waning and Demise of the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine/Rights-Privilege Distinction and the Rise of the Nexus
Requirement for Off-Duty Speech, Expressive Conduct and
Association
Slightly over two years after the Supreme Court's decision in Beilan,
the Court again took up teacher off-duty associational issues in Shelton
v. Tucker. 10 4 In Shelton, an Arkansas statute compelled every teacher,
as a condition of employment in a state-supported school or college, to
file annually an affidavit listing without limitation every organization to
which he or she had belonged or regularly contributed within the
preceding five years. 10 5 Two teachers challenged the statute on First
Amendment freedom of association grounds applicable to the states
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 6 Pulling back from its broad
holdings in Adler and Beilan allowing for significant limitations on
teacher's associational rights, the Supreme Court reversed decisions of
the lower court upholding the statute.
The Court began its analysis by affirming two principles enunciated
in Adler and Beilan, i.e., that the state has a strong interest in teacher
competency and fitness because of the effect that teachers have on
students, 108and that the assessment of teacher fitness is not limited to
the teacher's classroom conduct. 10 9 However, in an "about face" to
those prior two decisions, where the government's interest held primacy
and readily trumped the rights of teachers, the Court waxed eloquently
about the rights and needs of teachers for associational privacy:
It is not disputed that to compel a teacher to disclose his every
associational tie is to impair that teacher's right of free association,
677, 706-07 (2014).
102. 357 U.S. at 405 (quoting Adler, 342 U.S. at 493); see supra note 98 and accompanying text.
103. 357 U.S. at 406-07 (quoting Horosko v. Sch. Dist. of Mount Pleasant Twp., 6 A.2d 866, 868,
869-70 (Pa. 1939); see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
104. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
105. Id. at 480.
106. Id. at 480, 484-85.
107. Id. at 490.
108. Id. at 485 (quoting Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952)).
109. 364 U.S. at 485 (quoting Belian v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 406 (1958)).

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 83

a right closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like
free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society ....

Such

interference with personal freedom is conspicuously accented
when the teacher serves at the absolute will of those to whom the
disclosure must be made-those who any year can terminate the
teacher's employment without bringing charges, without notice,
without a hearing, without affording an opportunity to explain.
... [T]he pressure upon a teacher to avoid any ties which might

displease those who control his professional destiny would be
constant and heavy. Public exposure, bringing with it the
possibility of public pressures upon school boards to discharge
teachers who belong to unpopular or minority organizations, would
simply operate to widen and aggravate the impairment of
constitutional liberty. 110
Having previously refused to protect teachers' constitutional rights
under the "rights-privilege distinction," the Court concluded by stating
that the need to protect speech and association rights was at its highest
concerning teachers when compared to any other profession:
The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more
vital than in the community of American schools. By limiting the
power of the States to interfere with freedom of speech and
freedom of inquiry and freedom of association, the Fourteenth
Amendment protects all persons, no matter what their calling. But,
in view of the nature of the teacher's relation to the effective
exercise of the rights which are safeguarded by the Bill of Rights
and by the Fourteenth Amendment, inhibition of freedom of
thought, and of action upon thought, in the case of teachers brings
the safeguards of those amendments vividly into operation.' 11
If the Supreme Court had mortally wounded the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine/right-privilege distinction in Shelton, the Court

110. Id. at 485-87.
11. Id. at 487; see also Bruce Beezer, School Employee's Dismissal for Violation of
Desegregation Patronage Policy, 37 ED. L. REP. 763, 764 (1987) (noting the change from Adler to
Shelton and stating that "[t]he Court began to acknowledge that public employees could retain their
constitutional rights in the employment setting."). The jurisprudential arc of the Court's decisions in the
associational rights area can be fairly described as an initial adoption and subsequent refutation of the
excesses of McCarthyism. See JoNel Newman, Will Teachers Shed Their FirstAmendment Rights at
the Schoolhouse Gate? The Eleventh Circuit's Post-GarcettiJurisprudence, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 761,
763-64 (2009); William T. Mayton, "Buying Up" Speech: Active Government and the Terms of the
Firstand Fourteenth Amendments, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 373, 374 n.4 (1994); Richard H. Hiers,
Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and Universities: 0 Say Does that Star-Spangled First
Amendment Banner Yet Wave? 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 6-12 (1993).
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buried it seven years later in Keyishian v. Board of Regents.1 l2 There,
the Court was faced with a First Amendment challenge by several public
university faculty members to portions of the same New York law
requiring disclosure of membership in alleged subversive organizations
that the Court had adjudicated fifteen years earlier in Adler.' 3 Quoting
its decision in Shelton about the need for constitutional protection in
public schools, 114 the Court struck down the law on First Amendment
5 Further, the Court left no doubt that the unconstitutional
grounds. 11
conditions doctrine/rights-privilege distinction was a dead letter in the
public employment context, stating:
...[T]he theory that public employment which may be denied

altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how
unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.... Indeed, that theory

was expressly rejected in a series of decisions following
Adler.... It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of
religion and expression may be infringed by the
6 denial of or
"
privilege.
or
benefit
a
upon
conditions
of
placing
One year after the Supreme Court's decision in Keyishian, the Court7
issued its seminal decision in Pickering v. Board of Education."1
Pickering first reiterated the Court's holdings in Shelton and Keyishian,
noting that "[t]o the extent that [the lower court's] ...opinion may be
read to suggest that teachers may constitutionally be compelled to
relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy.., it

proceeds on a premise that has been unequivocally rejected in numerous
prior decisions of this Court."" 8 Pickering also expanded teachers'
First Amendment rights by: (1) recognizing that teachers must be free
from retaliatory adverse employment actions by school boards when
speaking as citizen on matters of public concern; and (2) establishing a
balancing test concerning the rights of teachers and the interests of9
school districts in efficiently operating an educational enterprise."
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions placed additional judicial gloss on
teacher and public employee speech rights in the workplace but, with
112. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
113. Id. at 592-93.
114. Id. at 603 (quoting Shelton, 364 U.S. at 487).
115. Id. at 609-10.
116. Id. at 605-06 (citations omitted).
117. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
118. Id. at 568 (citing, inter alia, Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)).
119. See id. at 568 ("The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.").
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one partial exception, did not address teacher off duty speech unrelated
to the teacher's employment. 120 Instead, that case (and subsequent
Supreme Court cases) was to come in the broader public employee
context.
3. The Nexus Requirement for Off-Duty Speech, Unrelated to the
Public Employee/Teacher's Employment
1 21
In United States v. National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU),

the Supreme Court evaluated, as against a First Amendment challenge,
the constitutionality of a Congressional ban on receipt of honoria for
public speaking or writing by federal government employees. 122 A
majority of the Court, with Justice O'Connor concurring and dissenting,
concluded that the ban did not comport with,
and, indeed, ran afoul of,
123
Amendment.
First
the
of
requirements
the
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, first noted that
"[t]he prohibition applie[d] even when neither the subject of the speech
or article nor the person or group paying for it ha[d] any connection with
the employee's official duties.' ' 2 4
After determining that the
government employee speech constituted comment as citizens on
matters of public concern, rather than employee speech on workplace
matters, the majority further reiterated that "[t]he speeches and articles
for which [the employees] received compensation in the past were
addressed to a public audience, were made outside the workplace, and
125
involved content largely unrelated to their government employment."'
Under these circumstances, the majority concluded that the government
had not satisfied its burden under the Pickering balancing test of
justifying what amounted to a significant restriction on both its
120. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (further defining what constitutes a matter
of public concern in the context of complaints about the workplace and holding that whether a matter is
of public concern is a threshold inquiry); Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979)
(making clear that a teacher's private conversation with her principal about a matter of public concern
-her belief that the school district's employment policies were racially discriminatory-constituted
protected speech); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (enunciating a shifting
burden of proof on causation in First Amendment retaliation cases in a case involving a teacher's speech
concerning school district dress and appearance policy ); but cf Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378
(1987) (protecting on-duty speech of a clerical worker in a constable's office unrelated to employment,
but derogatory toward the President as a matter of public concern and concluding that Pickering
balancing test weighed in employee's favor).
121. 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
122. Id. at 457. Section 501(b) of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 provided that, with several
exceptions, "[a]n individual may not receive any honorarium while that individual is a Member, officer
or employee" of the federal government. 5 U.S.C. app. 501 (b) (2012).
123. Id. at 457; id. at 480 (O'Connor, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
124. Id. at457.
125. Id. at 466.
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employees' expressive activities and the public's right to hear and read
what the employees would have said or written. 126 In particular, the
majority noted that, primarily because the employee speech occurred
outside of and was unrelated to government employment, the
government had not demonstrated that the ban on honoraria was
necessary to prevent "immediate workplace disruption" or to protect
"operational efficiency" in government service. 127 The majority
concluded by rejecting the government's request for a narrowing
interpretation of the honoria ban that would save the statute from
constitutional infirmity.' 28 Specifically, the majority declined to engage
in what it referred to as "judicial legislation" by refusing to impose a
nexus requirement that would save the statute where there was a
connection between the speaker's official duties and either the subject
matter of the expressive activities
or the identity of the individual or
29
group paying the honorarium. 1
Justice O'Connor concurred in the result. 130 She further noted that,
unlike most of the Court's earlier decisions which addressed
government employee speech at or concerning the workplace, "this case
presents no ... question whether the speech is of public, or merely

private, concern. Respondents challenge the ban as it applies to off-hour
speech bearing no nexus to Government employment-speech that by
definition does not relate to 'internal office affairs' or the employee's
status as an employee."'13 1 Applying Pickering, Justice O'Connor
agreed with the majority that the employee's interest in speaking
132
outweighed the government's interest in regulating employee speech.
Thus, Justice O'Connor "agree[d] with the Court that § 501 is
unconstitutional to the extent that it bars this class of employees from
receiving honoraria for expressive activities that bear no nexus to
Government employment."' 133 However, Justice O'Connor disagreed
with the majority concerning its refusal to impose a nexus requirement,
indicating that she would have upheld the statute as constitutional in
cases where the employees' expressive activities were related to their
official duties. 134
The Supreme Court next took up the question of whether and how the

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 465-70 (citing Pickering,391 U.S. at 568).
Id. at 470-74.
Id. at 479.
Id.
Id. at 480 (O'Connor, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id. at 481-85.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 486.
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off-duty or on-duty context and workplace-related or workplaceunrelated content of public employee speech or expressive conduct
affects First Amendment analysis in an employee termination case in
City of San Diego v. Roe. 135 In Roe, a San Diego police officer made a
video showing himself stripping off a police uniform and
masturbating. 136 He then sold the video, among other items, on the
adults-only section of eBay. 137 The uniform was not the specific
uniform worn by the San Diego police, but it was clearly identifiable as
a police uniform. 138 Roe's eBay user profile also identified him as
employed in the field of law enforcement. 139 Roe's supervisors
discovered Roe's activities and an investigation ensued. 140 When the
investigation revealed that Roe's conduct violated specific police
department policies, including conduct unbecoming of an officer,
outside employment, and immoral conduct, the department ordered Roe
to cease and desist from his on-line activities; 14' however, Roe failed to
fully comply with the order. 14 2 The police department further cited Roe
for violating or disobeying lawful orders and began termination
43 The proceedings resulted in Roe's dismissal from the
proceedings. 144
1
police force.
The Supreme Court upheld Roe's dismissal in a per curiam
opinion. 145 As a threshold matter, the Court treated Roe's video as
expressive conduct protectable under the First Amendment.146 Next, the
Court, drawing on the distinction discussed by Justice O'Connor in her
concurrence and dissent in NTEU, articulated differing legal standards

135. 543 U.S. 77 (2004).

136. Id. at 78.
137. Id.
138. Id.

139. Id.
140. Id. at 78-79.
141. Id. at 79.
142.

Id.

143. Id.
144. Id.

at 78, 85.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 83, 84. The Supreme Court has long held that conduct, without more, is not protected
under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 109 (1972). The Court has
also held, however, that expressive conduct may be protected as speech under that constitutional
provision. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003). "In deciding whether particular conduct
possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play," the Court has
"asked whether '[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the
likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it."' Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,410-11 (1974)) (internal
quotations omitted). In a related context to the facts in Roe, the Court has held that nude dancing is
expressive conduct that "falls within the outer ambit of the First Amendment's protection." City of Erie
v. Pap's A. M., 529 U.S. 277, syllabus (2000) (citations omitted).
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for regulating public employee speech depending on whether the
expressive activity occurred in the on-duty or off-duty context and
involved workplace-related or workplace-unrelated content:
A government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment
rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her
employment .... On the other hand, a governmental employer may
impose certain restraints on the speech of its employees, restraints
that would be unconstitutional if applied to the general public. The
Court has recognized the right of employees to speak on matters of
public concern, typically matters concerning government policies
that are of interest to the public at large, a subject on which public
employees are uniquely qualified to comment. See Connick, supra;
Pickeringv. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will
Cty., 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). Outside
of this category, the Court has held that when government
employees speak or write on their own time on topics unrelated to
their employment, the speech can have First Amendment
protection, absent some governmental justification "far stronger
than mere speculation" in regulating it. United States v. Treasury
Employees, 513 U.S. 47454, 465, 475, 115 S.Ct. 1003, 130 L.Ed.2d
964 (1995) (NTEU). 1
Addressing the NTEU line of authority first, the Court noted that
Roe's expressive conduct was both related to his employment and
harmful to his employer, stating that:
Although Roe's activities took place outside the workplace and
purported to be about subjects not related to his employment, the
[police department] demonstrated legitimate and substantial
interests of its own that were compromised by his speech. Far from
confining his activities to speech unrelated to his employment, Roe
took deliberate steps to link his videos and other wares to his
police work, all in a way injurious to his employer. The use of the
uniform, the law enforcement reference in the Web site, the listing
of the speaker as "in the field of law enforcement," and the
debased parody of an officer performing indecent acts while in the
course of official duties brought the mission of the employer and

147. Roe, 543 U.S. at 80 (Keyishian citation omitted). Commenting favorably about the Supreme
Court's decision in Roe, Professor Estlund stated that "[t]he good news is that if an employee's speech is
unrelated to the employment-if it takes place outside the workplace and its content is not related to the
job-then the speech is not subject merely to the limited protections of the Connick-Pickeringtest but
rather enjoys something like the full protection of the First Amendment." Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech
Rights that Work at Work: From the First Amendment to Due Process, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1463, 146768 (2007).

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 83

the professionalism of its officers into serious disrepute.
The present case falls outside the protection afforded in NTEU. The
authorities that instead control, and which are considered below,
are this Court's decisions in Pickering, supra, Connick, 461
U.S.
148
138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, and the decisions which follow them.
Turning to the Pickering line of authority, the Court quickly
dispatched Roe's arguments, concluding that "there is no difficulty in
concluding that Roe's expression does not qualify as a matter of public
concern under any view of the public concern test. He fails the
threshold test and balancing does not come into play." 149
C. Summary
In both the teachers' off-duty conduct and speech/expressive conduct
and association contexts, the evolution of Supreme Court and state law
case authority has been marked by a move toward greater protection of
teachers' right through judicially-created nexus requirements.
Although speech and conduct are generally treated differently for
purposes of First Amendment analysis, 150 it is not surprising that the
analysis concerning teacher off-duty conduct and speech would
converge toward a nexus requirement since both categories of
activity/expression implicate constitutional rights: principles of privacy
and notice and vagueness under the due process clause when conduct is
involved 15 1 and principles of freedom of speech, expression and
association when speech and expressive conduct are involved. 152 By

148. Roe, 543 U.S. at 81-82. Professor Estlund viewed this aspect of the Court's decision in Roe
less favorably, opining that "[t]he bad news for employees lies in the Court's unanimous holding that
Roe's pornographic videos were not unrelated to his employment, and therefore did not qualify for the
broader and more robust protection." Estlund, supra note 147, at 1468. Another respected scholar has
expressed similar chagrin concerning Roe's unduly expansive view concerning whether expressive
conduct is related to employment. Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of Off-Duty
Government Employees, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 2117, 2160 [hereinafter Papandrea I] ("Interpreting
'work related' in the broad manner Roe suggests threatens to swallow all of the expressive activities of
public employees, at least as soon as the public at large learns the identity of the speaker, and places
employees in perpetual danger of losing their jobs for anything they say, even outside of the
workplace.").
149. Roe, 543 U.S. at 84.
150. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) ("[T]he Court's First
Amendment cases draw vital distinctions between words and deeds, between ideas and conduct."); see
also Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment
Freedom of Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 54, 110 (1989) (arguing attempt to distinguish between speech
and conduct is "doomed to failure") and discussion at infra notes 290-300, 316-30, 333 and 337-38 and
accompanying texts.
151. See supra notes 53-78 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 79-149 and accompanying text.
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cabining the grounds upon which school districts and teacher licensing
boards may take adverse employment and licensing action against
teachers, this evolution has laudably protected teachers' rights in the
above-mentioned areas and given teachers better notice of the kind of
conduct and speech or expressive activities that will legitimately lead to
adverse action against them.' 53 At the same time, the nexus requirement
has continued to allow districts and licensing boards sufficient discretion
and power to take action against teachers who, by their off-duty
conduct, are unfit to teach, or, by their off-duty speech or expressive
conduct, impermissibly put their interests ahead of their school district
employers and the students they both serve.
Although an improvement over unadorned statutory terms such as
"immorality" or "conduct unbecoming of a teacher," and more likely 1to
54
provide teachers with fair notice of prohibited conduct and speech,
the nexus requirement and the principle of fitness to teach remain
subject to legitimate criticism. Notwithstanding that courts have upheld
the term "unfitness to teach" as against due process vagueness
challenges, 155 the term is vague in that it requires teachers to predict
whether his or her conduct or speech will offend local community
standards and punishes them when they are incorrect in that
1 56
assessment-assuming the teacher has engaged in such calculation.
Thus, one commentator has correctly pointed out that immorality
statutes, even when narrowed by a "fitness to teach" construction,
...require

those who

enforce

them to

read an unstated

"community standard" into the statute. For example, two courts
may interpret "immorality" as encompassing different conduct: a
liberal, tolerant community conceivably might not find anything
wrong with a teacher who is homosexual; yet a rural town in the
Bible belt may have grave difficulty in accepting this teacher in its

153. Fulmer, supra note 31, at 287 ("[R]equiring a showing of proper nexus between the conduct
and the teacher's fitness to teach makes vague statutes based on mere "immorality" fundamentally more
fair.").
154. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 387-90 (Cal. 1969).
156. See Amber Fischer, "Immoral Conduct": A Fair Standardfor Teachers?, 28 J. L. & EDUC.
477, 483 (1999) ("By incorporating standards less vague than 'immoral conduct' and 'unfitness to
teach,' legislatures will better inform teachers of the behavior expected of them. If a teacher knows his
conduct might be a basis for his termination, he will be less likely to engage in it."). In addition, the
California Supreme Court stated in Morrison that, although the statutory "immorality" provision, when
construed to mean "fitness to teach," was "not unconstitutional on its face[, t]his construction does not
mean that the statute will always be constitutional as applied. There may be borderline conduct which
would justify a finding of unfitness to teach but about which a teacher would not have a sufficiently
definite warning as to the possibility of suspension or revocation." 461 P.2d at 389 n.36.
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schools. 157
Similarly, another commentator has stated "a subjective community
standard creates a situation in which respect for teachers' privacy and
due process rights depends on whether the school is in a rural or urban
And, other commentators have likewise opined that
area." 158
"[c]ommunity standards are important to a court's consideration of
whether a teacher's behavior is immoral. Moral standards vary from
community to community and what may be tolerated or overlooked in
one area may be used as a reason for discharge in another."' 5 9 Yet, it is
undeniable "that parents and the community have a legitimate concern
about the qualifications and actions of those individuals the school
district places in positions of power and trust over their
children.... Standing in place of the parent [under the in loco parentis
has meaning. The public cannot be
doctrine] while a child is at school
0
left out of the public school."16
In addition, Morrison's and other courts' use of notoriety as a factor
in determining fitness to teach is problematic on several levels. First,
focusing on notoriety in determining whether teacher conduct (or
speech) may properly lead to adverse employment or licensure action
tends to revive the bare "immorality" or "conduct unbecoming of a
teacher" standard prevalent during the pre-nexus period. It does so by
shifting the inquiry back to public opinion and community standard
analysis with the concomitant risk to teachers' privacy and associational
rights. 16 1 Stated another way, asking whether a teacher's conduct has
become well known amongst students and patrons in the community
necessarily asks whether a sufficient number of community members
have been offended by the conduct such that a teacher's fitness to teach
has been significantly or irreparably brought into question.
Second, the notoriety of a teacher's conduct or misconduct leads to
arbitrary and inconsistent results. Assume that two teachers have
157. Fulmer, supra note 31, at 275.
158. Shotwell, supra note 19, at 63. Shotwell also correctly suggests that assessing and
disciplining teacher conduct by local community standards may inferentially suggest that the school
district does not respect diversity, including racial, ethnic, religious and sexual orientation diversity, in
its student body. Id. at 69. Thus, as Shotwell points out "[w]hen school districts choose to discharge or
discipline teachers based on their private, sexual conduct, administrators may be sending a message to
their students that their nonconforming behavior or identity is unacceptable." Id. at 69. Accord, see
DeMitchell, supra note 19, at 328 n.6.
159. John C. Walden and Renee Culverhouse, Homosexuality and Public Education, 55 ED. L.

REP. 7, 15 (1989).
160. DeMitchell, supranote 19, at 337-338.
161. Shotwell, supra note 19, at 66 ("Conduct not in conformity with a community's traditional
gender and sexual norms could be deemed hostile to the welfare of the general public simply because it
makes some people uncomfortable and forces parents and school administrators to acknowledge the
diversity that exists across all human populations.").
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engaged in and been convicted of the same criminal behavior-say,
driving under the influence or being intoxicated in public; however, one
teacher's conviction is publicized in the local newspaper or in the
blogosphere and the other teacher is fortunate enough to completely
avoid publicity. The first teacher is more likely1to62 suffer employment or
licensure consequences than the second teacher.
Third, when evaluating the notoriety issue in a teacher dismissal case,
courts quite properly attempt to parse causation and allocate blame
between the teacher and the school district, viewing notoriety as a
negative factor for the teacher when the teacher's conduct or the teacher
him/herself has caused the notoriety, but discounting the existence of the
notoriety when the school district itself has publicized the teacher's
conduct.'1 63 On one level, this approach is appropriate in the sense that a
teacher should not suffer the consequences of notoriety that he or she
did not cause; however, on another level, to the extent that the notoriety
of a teacher's conduct or misconduct may be germane to assessing a
teacher's fitness to teach, the cause of the notoriety is of little moment,
since its existence will presumably undermine a teacher's effectiveness
regardless of its source. 164
Unlike some, this Article does not suggest that the nexus standard be
banished from all consideration in evaluating teacher off-duty conduct
It does, however, take the position that notoriety
or speech.
considerations should be minimized or eliminated. 165
The key,
ultimately, is to use those factors within a framework of analysis and in
a more limited fashion when other, more explicit, indicators of
community standards-such as state statutory law, Codes of Ethics for

162. See, e.g., Scott, 156 N.E.2d at 3 (teacher dismissal affirmed after his public intoxication
became well known in the community); see also McCullough v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 562 N.E.2d
1233, 1237 (111.App. Ct. 1990) (same result where teacher's conviction for tax evasion became wellpublicized).
163. See, e.g., Rogliano v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 347 S.E.2d 220, 225 (W.Va. 1986) (cited
in Chester M. Nolte, Establishingthe Nexus: A School Board Primer,38 ED. L. REP. 1, 8 (1987)).
164. Particularly when a school district has caused the notoriety concerning a teacher's conductbut also in any instance where a teacher will be returning to the classroom under circumstances where
his or her absence due to suspension, placement on leave or dismissal has caused negative publicity or
speculation about the reasons for the absence or the teacher's fitness to teach-the teacher and the
school district should consider whether a public statement by the school district, or by the school district
and the teacher jointly, about the teacher's return would mollify the impact of the teacher's conduct
and/or absence.
165. As alluded to above, Shotwell suggests that both the nexus and notoriety requirements from
the California Supreme Court's decision in Morrison and its progeny should be eliminated-primarily
because they promote conformity, open up teachers' lives to unwarranted scrutiny and are potentially at
odds with promoting and accepting diversity amongst public school students. See Shotwell, supra note
19, at 73. Professor DeMitchell disagrees, primarily because of the community's legitimate expectation
that teachers should serve as role models, although he does agree with Shotwell "that exemplar can be
an unwarranted and an undeserved burden on educators." DeMitchell, supranote 19, at 335.
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the teaching profession,' 66 and school board policy-have not been
enunciated or cannot be gleaned. Similarly, as to speech and expressive
or associational conduct, this Article does not intend to jettison the
nexus requirement concerning public employee off-duty speech and
expressive conduct recently fashioned by the Supreme Court in NTEU
and Roe. Rather, this Article will likewise place those two Supreme
Court decisions and other teacher-specific lower court decisions relying
on them within the above-mentioned framework, suggesting only minor
revisions to the Supreme Court's off-duty public employee speech
jurisprudence.
The Article will turn now to a summary of that proposed framework,
followed by a more detailed discussion and analysis of existing case law
and other examples and their place within that framework.
III. THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK SUMMARIZED
In evaluating adverse employment or licensure action taken by school
boards or state licensing agencies against teachers based on their offduty conduct or speech unrelated to their employment, courts and those
administrative decisionmakers should apply the following standards:
A.Lawful off-duty conduct or speech, expressive conduct or
association not involving students should be presumed to have
no effect on a teacher's fitness to teach, and, except in unusual
circumstances, should not serve
as a basis for adverse
67
employment or licensure action; 1
B. Unlawful off-duty conduct or unprotected speech, i.e. conduct
or speech proscribed by federal or state statutory law, the Code
of Ethics for the teaching profession adopted in the state, or
local school board policy, may or may not render a teacher
unfit to teach, and, as such, may or may not constitute
sufficient grounds for adverse employment or licensure
action; 168
Evaluation of teacher fitness under these circumstances should
include the following criteria:
1. Relatively minor unlawful off-duty conduct (such as
misdemeanor offenses) and certain categories of

166. A recent empirical study indicates that approximately two-thirds of the states have adopted
codes of ethics for educators, with most of those having the force of law. Perry A. Zirkel, State Ethical
Codesfor School Leaders, 43 J. L. & EDUC. 503, 529 (2014).
167. See infra notes 174-264 and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 265-338 and accompanying text.
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unprotected/misdemeanor off-duty speech will not
generally have a sufficient nexus to teacher fitness and will
not constitute a basis for adverse employment or licensure
action unless such conduct or speech 69
relates to the
1
students;
involves
or
employment
teacher's
2. Significant unlawful off-duty conduct (such as felony
offenses) and speech not otherwise protected under the
First Amendment and typically subject to felony criminal
sanctions (obscenity, fighting words and true threats) will
usually have a sufficient nexus to teacher fitness to
constitute a basis for adverse employment or licensure
action; 170
3. Serious off-duty felonious conduct exploiting children or
speech/expressive activities doing the same will be
presumed to render a teacher unfit to teach and, except in
unusual circumstances, will constitute grounds for adverse
employment or licensure action; 171 and
4. Serious off-duty felonious conduct involving crimes
against children or speech/expressive activities involving
harm to children will per se render a teacher unfit to teach
and will constitute for permanent adverse employment and
licensure action. 172

Having set forth a bare-bones outline of the proposed framework, the
73
Article will now turn to a more detailed explication of the framework. 1

169. See infra notes 265-300 and accompanying text.
170. See infra notes 301-30 and accompanying text.
171. See infra notes 331-33 and accompanying text.
172. See infra notes 334-38 and accompanying text.
173. A noted First Amendment, social media and national security scholar has recently proposed a
new framework for evaluating teacher speech cases. See generally Mary-Rose Papandrea, Social
Media, Public School Teachers, and the First Amendment, 90 N.C.L. REV. 1597 (2012) [hereinafter
Papandrea 11]. Professor Papandrea's framework, while extremely helpful and well-thought out, is
focused on teacher lawful speech cases- primarily in the context of off-duty social media use.
Although Professor Papandrea's framework adopts the nexus requirement from the modem teacher
conduct cases, it explores teacher conduct cases only in passing. Likewise, another commentator has
proposed a new framework for analyzing off-duty speech by public employees generally, but again,
does not addresses off-duty public employee or teacher conduct. See generally Jeffrey A. Shooman,
Comment, The Speech of Public Employees Outside of the Workplace: Toward a New Framework, 36
SETON HALL L. REV. 1341 (2006). In addition, neither Papandrea nor Shooman addresses off-duty
teacher speech which violates the criminal law and/or is not protected by the First Amendment.
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THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK EXPLICATED

A. Off-Duty Lawful Teacher Conduct or Speech not Involving
Students

1. Off-Duty Lawful Conduct
When a teacher engages in lawful off-duty conduct that does not
involve students, a school district or state licensing board has very little
legitimate interest in regulating the teacher's conduct. The conduct
rarely impacts students and, even if students learn about it, the teacher's
right to engage in conduct within the bounds of the law and right to not
suffer adverse employment or licensure action when doing so clearly
outweighs the government employer's or state's interest in regulating
teachers. Under these circumstances, a rebuttable presumption should
arise in the teacher's favor that the teacher remains fit to teach and,
therefore, not subject
to adverse employment or licensure action on
74
1
grounds.
these
The best example of the proper judicial approach to a school district's
attempt to take adverse employment action against a teacher under these
circumstances is Land v. L'Anse Creuse Public School Board of

Education.175 There, a school board fired a female teacher after a video
taken without the teacher's knowledge showing her simulating fellatio
on a male mannequin while attending a combined bachelor/bachelorette
party on a boat during a day off from school was posted on the internet
174. A presumption has been defined as "a rule of law, statutory or judicial, by which finding of a
basic fact gives rise to existence of presumed fact, until presumption is rebutted .... A legal device
which operates in the absence of other proof to require that certain inferences be drawn from the
available evidence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1185 (6th Ed. 1990). Both federal and a number of
state rules of evidence provide that "the party against whom a presumption is directed has the burden of
producing evidence to rebut the presumption." FED. R. EVID. 301; see also MD. EVID. R. 5-301; IND.
EVID. R. 301.
The author is not aware of any reported decisions discussing or establishing a rebuttable presumption in
favor of teachers under these circumstances. However, as discussed below, courts and commentators
have opined that public employee, including teacher, off-duty speech unrelated to work should be
presumptively entitled to First Amendment protection. Locurto v. Guiliani, 447 F.3d 159, 172 (2d Cir.
2006) (public employees); Papandrea 1,supra note 148, at 2120-21 (same); Papandrea I1,supra note
172, at 1630 (teachers); see discussion infra at note 206 and accompanying text. Moreover, at least one
jurisdiction has established the converse of this presumption in the teacher conduct area, i.e. that where
a teacher engages in unlawful, sexually provocative or exploitative conduct with students, "a strong
presumption of unfitness arises against the teacher." Ricci v. Davis, 627 P.2d 1111, 1120 (Colo. 1981)
(en banc) (quoting Weissman v. Bd. of Educ., 547 P.2d 1267, 1273 (Colo. 1976)); see discussion infra
at note 320 and accompanying text. Accordingly, both as a matter of legal symmetry and so as to more
clearly explicate the nexus requirement, a teacher's lawful off-duty conduct not directed at students and
unrelated to his or her employment should correspondingly receive a presumption in favor of the
teacher's fitness to teach.
175. No. 288612, 2010 WL 2135356 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010).
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without her consent. 176 The board made the decision to fire the teacher
on the grounds that her conduct constituted "lewd behavior contrary to
the moral values of the educational and school community, which
undermined her moral authority and professional responsibilities as a
role model for students."' 177 After the State Tenure Commission
law judge and reinstated the
reversed the decision of an administrative
78
1
appealed.
Board
School
the
teacher,
The Michigan Court of Appeal affirmed.' 79 The Court first noted the
lack of judicial authority relating to the issue before it, stating that "no
appellate cases involve a teacher's termination based on lawful, off-duty
conduct occurring off school premises, not involving students."' 8' The
Court then characterized the nature of the facts before it and rendered its
decision under the legal standard governing the board's appeal:
[T]he conduct complained of did not involve students, was not
committed while the teacher was performing duties for the school,
and was not intended to be seen, known, or discussed with
students. Given the lack of binding precedent on this issue and the
requirement that reasonable and just cause "be shown only by
significant evidence proving that the teacher is unfit to teach," the
commission's decision to reinstate petitioner cannot be deemed in
excess of its authority, arbitrary or capricious, or contrary to law. 18'
...

The Court went on to discuss the specific facts in the case, restating
its decision as follows:
Examination of the entire record reveals that the photographs
engendered widespread gossip and some students and parents lost
respect for petitioner. Further, there was expert testimony that the
conduct depicted in the photographs would tend to cause students
to lose respect for their teacher, and could adversely affect
learning. However, some parents testified that while the internet
posting of the photographs was unfortunate, they had not lost
respect for petitioner as a teacher or a person. Moreover, there was
overwhelming evidence that petitioner was an excellent teacher
who went above and beyond her responsibilities to assist her
students to learn and enjoy the material, and to assist students and

176. Id. at *1.
177. Id.
178. Id. Indeed, in Morrison, the paradigmatic off-duty conduct nexus case, the California
Supreme Court emphasized that Morrison was never charged with or convicted of a crime concerning
his homosexual conduct. 461 P.2d at 378 n.6. See also supra note 59 and accompanying text.
179. 2010 WL 2135356 at *8.
180. Id. at *6.
181. Id. at *7.
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parents with other issues that might arise. . . [W]e conclude that

the commission did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in deciding
that, where there is no professional misconduct, the notoriety of a
tenured teacher's off-duty, off-premises, lawful conduct, not
involving students or school activities, by2 itself, will not constitute
reasonable and just cause for discipline.'
Several states have taken a step further than the Land court. These
states have enacted statutes effectively codifing the legal doctrine and
result articulated by the court in Land by making it unlawful, except in
limited circumstances, for public employers, including school districts,
from taking adverse employment action against employees, including
83
teachers, based on their having engaged in lawful off-duty conduct. 1
Yet, not all courts have been so sanguine about lawful teacher offduty conduct. In Wishart v. McDonald,184 another off-duty conduct case
involving a teacher and a mannequin, the First Circuit upheld a school
board's dismissal of a teacher with a diagnosed personality disorder for
engaging in conduct unbecoming of a teacher when he dressed a
mannequin in a negligee and paraded around outside of his residence
undressing and fondling his inanimate companion.' 85 Although the
Court acknowledged that the teacher's conduct "was probably not
criminal, nor.., seriously disruptive" and the undisputed testimony of
the teacher's psychiatrist was that the personality disorder would not
affect the teacher's classroom performance, role model and 8notoriety
6
considerations lead the Court to affirm the teacher's dismissal. 1

182. Id. In contrast, where teacher off-duty conduct involved unlawful conduct, i.e. posting of
nude or obscene photographs, and/or the teacher displayed the photos himself or did not expeditiously
remove them from the internet when displayed by others, courts and arbitrators have properly upheld
termination of teachers on nexus/unfitness to teach grounds. See, e.g., San Diego Unified School Dist.
v. Comm'n on Prof'l Competence, 194 Cal.App.4th 1454 (2011), Phoenix City Bd. of Educ., 125 Lab.
Arb. 1473 (Cal. 2009) (Baroni, Arb.); Warren City Bd. of Educ., 124 Lab. Arb. 532 (2007) (Skulina,
Arb.); Mark Paige & Todd A. DeMitchell, Arbitration Litigation Concerning Teacher Disciplinefor
Misuse of Technology: A Preliminary Assessment, 296 ED. L. REP. 22, 32-37 (2013) (citing above
cases).
183. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2011) (protecting "discharge from employment for
lawful conduct occurring during nonworking hours away from the employer's premises"); COLO. REv.
STAT. § 24-34-402.5 (2008) (providing a civil action for damages to public employees who are
discharged "due to that employee's engaging in any lawful activity off the premises of the employer
during nonworking hours" unless one of two exceptions applies); see also Ann C. McGinley & Ryan P.
McGinley-Stempel, Beyond the Water Cooler: Speech and the Workplace in an Era of Social Media, 30
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 75, 85 n.60 (2012) (discussing above statutes). In some jurisdictions,
similar statutes were written more narrowly to protect employees from being fired or discriminated
against for smoking cigarettes during their off-duty time and away from the workplace. Id. at 85 n.58.
184. 500 F.2d 1110 (1st Cir. 1974).
185. Id. at 1113-16.
186. Id.
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In Kinser v. West Branch Local School Dist., Board of Education,'87 a
teacher (Kinser) and her husband were both charged with multiple
counts of felonious cultivation and possession of marijuana after police
had raided their residence. 188 Based on the charges, the school board
suspended Kinser pending a decision on her termination.' 89 The charges
against Kinser were eventually dropped after her husband agreed to
plead guilty to two felony counts.'
This fact notwithstanding, the
school board continued to pursue Kinser's dismissal. 19 1 A referee
appointed by the school board recommended Kinser's reinstatement to
her teaching position based on his determination that the board had not
presented sufficient evidence to support a finding and conclusion of
"good and just cause" for Kinser's termination.' 92 The school board,
however, rejected the referee's recommendation and terminated
Kinser's
94
employment. 193 The trial court upheld the board's decision.1
The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. 195 The appellate court noted
that the referee's findings that Kinser had not smoked marijuana in a
number of years and did not condone her husband's marijuana use were
not against the weight of the evidence.' 96 The court further noted that
"the evidence does not support any violation of the drug laws by
plaintiff but that the evidence does establish that plaintiff was aware and
condoned her husband's cultivation of marijuana plants even though she
did not approve of such conduct. . . ." 97 Significantly, the appellate
court also concluded that "[i]f the violation of the law committed by
plaintiff s husband in this case was limited to the use and possession of
minor amounts of marijuana, we would hold that that fact alone would
' 98
be insufficient to terminate plaintiffs employment as a teacher."'
Although sympathetic to Kinser's plight, the appellate court, citing to
the Supreme Court's decisions in Belian and Adler concerning the effect
of a teacher's off-duty conduct on her fitness to teach, affirmed the trial
court's decision. 199 In so holding, the Ohio appellate court concluded as
follows:

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

No. 78 C.A. 57, 1978 WL 215086 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978).
Id. at *2.
d. at*1.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *13.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id. at *11-12.
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[N]either the personal guilt of plaintiff nor her role as a wife

are the issues in this case.
After reviewing the entire case we find that plaintiffs conduct in
condonation of her husband's felonious violation of the state drug
laws by his cultivation of marijuana and possession of marijuana
and continuous residence with him and her daughter with the
foreseeable results ... [of eventual search of their property, their

arrests with publication in the news media and adverse public
reaction] was a serious matter and that the decision of defendant
that such conduct extinguished plaintiff's effectiveness as a teacher
in the West Branch School District is supported by the evidence
and is not against the weight of the evidence.20 °
The Land case was correctly decided while the Wishart and Kinser
cases were incorrectly decided under the framework proposed in this
Article. Specifically, the court in Land correctly held that the teacher,
having engaged in lawful off-duty conduct, was entitled to a
presumption of continued fitness to teach and that any notoriety related
to her conduct did not rebut that presumption. In contrast, the courts in
Wishart and Kinser, by failingly to adhere to a presumption of fitness
under circumstances where the teacher had not engaged in illegal
conduct, improperly discounted the teacher's lawful conduct and
improperly elevated notoriety considerations in reaching that result.
Assigning a presumption of fitness to teach when a teacher faces
adverse employment or licensure action based on his or her lawful offduty conduct unrelated to students is appropriate for several reasons.
First, it provides notice to teachers (and school districts and teacher
licensing boards) concerning the type of conduct in which they
(teachers) may engage without fear of possible adverse professional
consequences, thereby combatting the chilling effect on the exercise of
constitutional behavior identified by the California Supreme Court in
Morrison.20 1 Second, it puts a more meaningful gloss on the immorality
and nexus standards by identifying explicit and ascertainable community
standards under positive law-state and federal laws, codes of ethics for
the teaching profession, and school board policy202-to which teachers
must conform their conduct.20 3 Third, it will make it more difficult for
200. Id. at "12.
201. See Morrison v. St. Bd. ofEduc. 561 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1969).
202. "Positive law" is defined as "enacted law-the codes, statutes, and regulations that are
applied and enforced in the courts." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1280 (9th ed. 2009).
203. Of course, the mere existence of a state or federal law, code of ethics provision or school
board policy is not in itself sufficient to establish a community standard, the violation of which will
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overzealous community members, parents, and school board members
and administrators to prevail on adverse employment or licensure

actions against teachers who have acted inconsistent with some
stakeholders' view of morality, but still within the bounds of the law.

Indeed, these circumstances will require leadership-often, courageous
leadership-by school administrators and board members and teacher

licensing decisionmakers to refrain from initiating adverse employment
or licensure action against teachers-and to explain their reasons for
refraining from doing so-to hostile stakeholders. And fourth, it would
allow-indeed, require-legislative or quasi-legislative administrative

bodies, such as local school boards and state boards of education, to
formulate and expressly articulate constitutionally-defensible policy

concerning teacher off-duty conduct if they wish to rely on such grounds
to terminate the employment or revoke the license of a teacher. 104
Because of the ability of legislatures, state boards of education, and

local school boards to speak for the community by enacting public
policy proscribing teacher off-duty conduct, the above-discussed
presumption of fitness would be strong.

However, the presumption

provide a basis for the determination that a teacher is unfit to teach. As discussed in cases such as
Morrison and NTEU, a federal, state or local enactment must satisfy constitutional standards, including
protecting the due process, expressive and associational rights of teachers. See generally Morrison, 461
P.2d at 375; U.S. v. Nat'l Treasure Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
204. Shotwell likewise suggests that, as an alternative to the nexus standard and notoriety factor,
compliance with or violation of positive law should be the standard for evaluating teacher fitness.
Shotwell, supra note 19, at 73. Specifically, she states that "[c]riminal proscriptions against sexual
conduct with minors and child endangerment laws are adequate to protect children from teachers who
would harm them, and schools can always discharge teachers for almost any criminal behavior or
explicitly proscribe worrisome conduct in a teacher's contract." Id. Professor DeMitchell disagrees,
suggesting that Shotwell's proposed standard suffers from the same vagueness as the immorality
standard and that only state dismissal laws, not negotiated contracts, can set the standard for teacher
dismissal. DeMitchell, supra note 19, at 336-37. Shotwell is partially correct, but fails to recognize that
the nexus standard must inform the analysis when teachers engage in unlawful off-duty conduct
unrelated to students. See discussion infra notes 265-89 and 301-15 and accompanying texts.
DeMitchell is correct in wanting to retain the nexus standard but, under this Article's proposed fitness
framework, evidence concerning nexus and notoriety need not factor into the equation where the
teacher's off-duty conduct is lawful and not involving students or is felonious conduct involving harm to
students resulting in a conviction and the legislature has mandated permanent certificate denial or
revocation. See discussion supra notes 174-206 and accompanying text and infra notes 334-36 and
accompanying text. In addition, although DeMitchell is correct that most states establish standards for
teacher dismissal via state law, which statutory law will control over collective bargaining provisions,
see, e.g., Anderson Fed'n of Teachers, Local 519 v. Alexander, 416 N.E.2d 1327, 1331-32 (Ind. App.
1981), several states have allowed school boards and local education associations to agree to provide
teachers with greater rights concerning dismissal than the rights provided by state law. See, e.g., Sch.
Comm. of Needham v. Needham Educ. Ass'n, 500 N.E.2d 1320, 1324 (Mass. 1986) (arbitrator did not
exceed his powers in applying broader teacher dismissal provision from collective bargaining agreement
than dismissal provision set forth in state statutory law); Hunting v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 161, 931
P.2d 628, 632-34 (Idaho 1997) (reduction-in-force and notice of re-employment provisions in collective
bargaining agreement giving teachers more rights than provided by state statutory law held enforceable).
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would not be conclusive or irrebuttable. 20 5 Certain teacher off-duty
conduct not involving students may be lawful, but may still constitute
grounds for adverse employment or licensure action. In particular, offduty conduct which is lawful, but which is or becomes related to the
teacher's employment may fall within that narrow category of cases
where the presumption of fitness might be rebutted. For example, a
teacher may engage in an affair with a colleague or even a colleague's
spouse. Although this conduct would not be unlawful (assuming laws
prohibiting adultery have been repealed), it might lead to adverse
employment consequences-typically a transfer with possible loss of
pay or status in a large school district, but possibly dismissal in a small
school district-if the affair causes disruption in the workplace.2 °6 The
teacher would suffer adverse consequences, not because he or she had
engaged in off-duty immoral conduct, but because the conduct was
related to her employment and affected the school district's legitimate
interests.
In sum, to refine and make more objective the nexus and fitness to
teach standards, teachers who engage in lawful, off-duty behavior not
involving students should be entitled to a strong presumption concerning
their fitness to teach, which should be rebuttable only upon proof that
the teacher's off-duty conduct disrupted the school district's legitimate
interest in operating its schools.

205. Black's defines "irrebuttable presumption" as "[a] presumption that cannot be overcome by
any additional evidence or argument." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1305 (9th ed. 2009). According to
the Supreme Court, a conclusive or irrebuttable presumption" .. . foreclose[s] the person against whom
it is invoked from demonstrating, in a particularized proceeding, that applying the presumption to him
will in fact not further the lawful governmental policy the presumption is designed to effectuate."
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120 (1989).
206. An employer, including a school board, who takes adverse employment action against an
employee, including a teacher, under these circumstances would not be subject to liability even if it did
not have an express anti-fraternization policy, i.e. a policy prohibiting off-duty intimate relations
between co-workers or between an employee and the spouse of a co-worker. See, e.g., generally
Triplett v. Belle of Orleans, LLC, Civ. A 98-2885, 2000 WL 2640002, at **1-5 (E.D. La. 2000)
(employee's continuing affair with a subordinate employee and the lack of judgment it demonstrated,
plus supervisor's dissatisfaction with employee's subsequent attitude and ability to work as part of the
team constituted a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating employee); see generally
Keppler v. Hinsdale Twp. High Sch., 715 F. Supp. 862 (N.D.Ill. 1989). The existence of an express
anti-fraternization policy adopted by a school board would not only be enforceable, see, e.g., Ellis v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 523 F.3d 823, 828 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding and concluding that violation of
employer's anti-fraternization policy was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for plaintiffs
discharge); Barbee v. Household Automotive Finance Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406, 411-14 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003) (upholding employer anti-fraternization policy as against state constitutional privacy and statutory
challenge); see also Montgomery v. Carr, 101 F.3d 1117, 1118 (6th Cir. 1996) (school board antinepotism policy upheld as against First Amendment challenge, but would cause re-categorization of the
teacher's conduct from off-duty lawful conduct to off-duty conduct prohibited by positive law).
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2. Off-Duty Lawful and Protected Speech
The Supreme Court's decisions in NTEU and Roe have been
interpreted and applied by lower courts in the teacher and other public
employee off-duty speech setting, with the analysis and results there
similar to the judicial approach taken concerning off-duty teacher
conduct in Land and under the lawful behavior aspect of the framework
proposed in this Article.20 7
Thus, lower federal courts have correctly held-and at least one other
scholar has cogently opined-that, where the content of a public
employee's lawful off-duty speech, expressive conduct or associational
activities does not concern his or her employment and is not directed to
his or her co-workers or others with whom the employee works, no
nexus will have been established and the speech should be presumed to
be entitled to First Amendment protection.20 8 As pointed out by one
lower court, quoting the dissent in NTEU, "'the Government's interests
are at their lowest ebb' where the content of employees' off-duty speech
is not related to their professional duties. 20 9
Those same courts and commentators have also held or opined that
the presumption of First Amendment protection may be overcome by
the public employer. 2 10 Thus, lower courts, relying on well-settled
principles enunciated by the Supreme Court, have held that public
employers may overcome proof that the public employee's expressive
behavior is protected under the First Amendment by satisfying its
burden under the second part of the Pickering balancing test, i.e., that
"the speech could cause [injury] to 'the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees. ' ,, 211 In evaluating the government's proof, a

207. Professor Papandrea has likewise recognized the symmetry between teacher off-duty speech
and conduct cases, noting that "[a] nexus approach finds support in cases in which teachers have been
punished for their off-duty conduct." Papandrea II, supra note 173 at 1638.
208. Locurto v. Guiliani, 447 F.3d 159, 175 (2d Cir. 2006) ("It is more sensible ... to treat offduty, non-work-related speech as presumptively entitled to First Amendment protection ..... ); Hall v.
Gallo, No. 030476708, 2008 WL 2796950, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008) (same); Jean-Gilles v. Cnty. of
Rockland, 463 F. Supp. 2d 437, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (same); Papandrea 1, supra note 148, at 2120
("[O]ff-duty, non-work-related speech by government employees should be entitled to presumptive
protection under the First Amendment."); Papandrea II, supra note 173, at 1630 ("[I]n cases involving
non-work-related expression, courts should ... afford such speech presumptive constitutional
protection....").
209. Navab-Safavi v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, 650 F.Supp. 2d 40, 57 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting
NTEU, 513 U.S. at 494 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)), affirmed in Navab-Safavi v. Glassman, 637 F.3d
211 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
210. See Locurto, 447 F.3d at 175-83; Navab-Safavi, 650 F. Supp.2d at 57-62; Papandrea II,
supra note 173, at 1630.
211. Locurto, 447 F.3d at 172 (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 668 (1994)); see also
Pickering,391 U.S. at 570-73; supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
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court may consider whether the statement: (1) "impairs discipline by
superiors or harmony among co-workers," (2) "has a detrimental impact
on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and
confidence are necessary," or (3) "impedes the performance of the
speaker's duties or interferes with the regular operation of the
enterprise.,, 2 12 As further gloss on the above-listed factors, a court
should also evaluate whether the public employee discredited his or her
employer by making the statements in public, or the employee's
expression demonstrated a character trait that made the public employee
unfit to perform his or her work.21 3 Or, as capsulized by one scholar in
the public school teacher context, the "presumption [of First
Amendment protection] can be overcome only if school officials can
demonstrate a significant nexus between the speech and the teacher's
fitness and ability to perform her educational duties. 214
In one of only a handful of teacher cases applying NTEU and Roe to

teacher off-duty speech, the district court for the Western District of
Kentucky addressed the threshold issue of whether a teacher's

expressive and associational activities were unrelated to work such that
the (more) public employee-friendly NTEU standard, rather than the
Pickering-Connick line of cases, applied.2 15 There, the school district

had reprimanded the teacher (Baar) for having violated a memorandum
prohibiting him from communicating with another teacher (Payne) and
attending meetings of the Louisville Area Chemistry Alliance
(LACA). 2 16 The trial court granted summary judgment on the claim,
finding and concluding that Baar's expressive and associational
activities were related to his work and, therefore, did not "fall ...within
the NTEU protection for speech that occurs outside of work and is

212. Navab-Safavi, 650 F.Supp. 2d at 55 (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388
(1987)).
213. Id. at 59-60 (quoting Rankin, 483 U.S. at 389). Courts have identified one other government
employer defense to an alleged First Amendment violation concerning the dismissal of an employee
who has exercised his or her expressive or associational rights away from work. Specifically, as an
exception to the general prohibition on taking adverse employment action against public employees for
their expressive or associational behavior, "policymaking staffers may permissibly be fired by elected
officials based on the staffers' political views and associations." Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 95 (2d Cir.
2005) (citing Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980)).
Teachers, however, are invariably not considered policymakers under the Elrod/Branti partisan
policymaker exception. Ill. State Emp. Union, Council 34 v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 574 (7th Cir. 1972);
Smith v. Harris, 560 F. Supp. 677, 694 (D.R.I. 1983). As such, this defense will seldom, if ever, come
in to play where a teacher challenges her dismissal for engaging in off-duty expressive or associational
behavior.
214. Papandrea I,supra note 173, at 1642.
215. Baar v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 3:06 CV-75-H, 2008 WL 360719 (W.D. Ky.
2008).
216. Id. at **2.
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unrelated to the subject of public employment. 2 1 7 In so holding, the
district court first articulated the NTEU standard, stating that "[t]he
Supreme Court has already said that absent a reason 'far stronger than
mere speculation,' where there is no relationship between the
employees' speech and their effective performance of their public
duties, public employers cannot
regulate the speech that employees
2 18
work."
of
outside
in
engage
The district court went on to evaluate the threshold "unrelated to
employment" issue, summarizing and assessing the evidence as follows:
Here, Plaintiffs involvement in LACA has some superficial
similarities to a non-work speech or association. The LACA
meetings occur outside normal work hours, and are not an
officially sanctioned school activity. The meetings are open to nonpublic school teachers....
However, Plaintiffs LACA participation is related to his work in
many other obvious and material ways. The LACA discussions
relate entirely or very closely to Plaintiffs work as a public school
science teacher. Indeed, his work forms the entire rationale for his
participation. Many of his public school colleagues, including
Payne, are members, and at least some LACA meetings take place
at public schools. Discussions among colleagues about their
professional goals and development are distinguishable from
statements made to public audiences. ... This would be a different
case, for instance, if Plaintiff were meeting with non-school
employees to discuss matters unrelated to science education.2" 9
The district court then concluded that:
Plaintiffs LACA activities involve topics and associations closely
related to Plaintiffs public employee duties. .. . The strong weight
of the evidence is that the activities are not those "unrelated to their
employment." Therefore, the speech is not protected under NTEU
and the Court need not balance Plaintiffs interest against the
employer's asserted interest in enacting the 2005 Reprimand.220

217. Id. at *8-9.
218. Id. (quoting NTEU, 513 U.S. at 475).
219. Id. at *9.
220. Id. (citing NTEU, 513 U.S. at 475; Roe, 543 U.S. at 81). The district court went on to
evaluate Baar's expressive and associational activities under the less exacting standard for assessing the
permissibility of public employer regulation of speech related to employment. See id. at **9-11. The
court concluded that Baar's activities were not protected under the First Amendment because they did
not pertain to a matter of public concern under the first prong of the Pickeringtest. Id. The Sixth Circuit
affirmed on that basis and did not reach the unrelated/related to employment issue. Baar v. Jefferson
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 311 Fed. Appx. 817, 821 (6th Cir. 2009).
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More recently, the issue of NTEU's applicability arose in Craig v.
Rich Township High School Dist. 227.21 In Craig, a public school
guidance counselor wrote and published a book concerning adult
relationship advice entitled "It's Her Fault," which explicitly discussed
sexually-provocative themes.222 After the school board learned of the
book, the board terminated Craig's employment.223 Craig then filed a
Section 1983 action against the school board and several of its
members. 224 The district court dismissed the action, finding and
concluding
that Craig's speech did not address a matter of public
22 5
concern.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed, albeit on alternative grounds.226

Although the Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court
concerning the public concern issues, the court determined that Craig's
book was sufficiently related to his employment such that NTEU did not
apply. 227 Specifically, the court stated as follows:
NTEU is of no help to Craig because he took "deliberate steps to
link" his book with his work as a guidance counselor at Rich
Central. See Roe, 543 U.S. at 80-81, 125 S.Ct. 521 (holding that
reliance on NTEU "was seriously misplaced" when plaintiff
deliberately linked speech to public employment). Craig included a
number of references to his job as a high school guidance
counselor within the pages of his book.... Because of Craig's
conscious choice to connect "It's Her Fault" to his counseling
position at Rich Central, his speech relates to his employment and
NTEU does not apply. 228
Applying Pickering, the Court of Appeals concluded by determining
that the school board's interest in taking adverse employment action
against22Craig
outweighed his interest in exercising his First Amendment
9
rights.

The leading off-duty teacher speech case is Melzer v. Board of
Education of City of New York. 230 There, Melzer, a Bronx high school
science teacher, was a member of the North American Man/Boy Love

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

736 F.3d I 110 (7th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1113.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1113-19
Id. at 1118.
Id. at 1118-21.
336 F.3d 185 (2nd Cir. 2003).
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Association (NAMBLA or Association). 231 NAMBLA is an advocacy
organization, which has sought, among other things, changes in the
public's attitude and in the laws concerning sexual activities between
men and boys and, in particular, changes in the law concerning the age
of consent and child pornography.232 In addition, Melzer wrote several
articles for the Association, offering advice to NAMBLA members on
how to avoid detection by law enforcement of sexual activities with
minors and how to lure susceptible children into sexual relations.233
During an investigation by the New York City School District, Melzer's
and other New York City teachers' membership in NAMBLA was
publicized by a number of media outlets.234 This publicity resulted in
several heated meetings attended by parents and students. Many of the
parents believed that Melzer should not be allowed to return to the
school (he had been on sabbatical), threatening to remove their children
235
from and/or stage a sit in at the school if he was allowed to do so.
Likewise, a majority of students at the meetings agreed with the parents
about Melzer, although "a few students... expressed the view that a
person not convicted of anything illegal should be allowed to practice
his profession. 236
The Board of Education eventually brought disciplinary proceedings
against Melzer based on his NAMBLA activities and the resulting
turmoil that it had caused in the school community. 237 After numerous
hearings over a three-year period, a hearing officer recommended
Melzer's termination.
The Board accepted the hearing officer's
recommendation and dismissed him from employment. 239 Melzer then
brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the
board's dismissal decision violated his rights to freedom of speech and
association under the First Amendment. 240 The district court affirmed
the Board's decision, finding that "Melzer was terminated solely
because his employer reasonably believed that the public exposure of
[Melzer's] associational activities ... was likely to impair Melzer's

effectiveness as a teacher and cause internal disruption if he were
returned to the classroom" 24 1 and concluding that "[t]he threat of such
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 188-89.
Id. at 189.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 190-91.
Id. at 191.
Id.
Id. at 191-92.
Id. at 192.
Id.
Id. (citing Mezer v. Bd. of Educ., 196 F. Supp. 2d 229 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)).
Id. (quoting Melzer, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 245).
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disruption.., weighed more heavily than Melzer's rights to speech and
association. 24 2
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.2 43 The Second
Circuit first noted that, in order for speech and associational activities to
be constitutionally protected, expressive behavior would typically have
to satisfy the Pickering balancing test. 244 Paraphrasing Pickering and
subsequent Supreme Court authority, the court reiterated that "[t]he
Pickering test involves a two-step inquiry: first, a court must determine
whether the speech which led to an employee's discipline relates to a
matter of public concern; and, second, if so, the balance between free
speech concerns is weighed against efficient public service to ascertain
to which the scale tips. '245 The Second Circuit, paralleling the
sentiment expressed by Justice O'Connor in her concurrence and dissent
in NTEU,246 next noted that Melzer's case differed from most public
employee speech cases in that it did not "involv[e] speech directed at an
employer, made at the place of employment or directly concerning the
employer in some way. 2 47 Specifically, the court pointed out that
"Melzer's termination stem[med] not from something done in the
workplace, but from First Amendment activities occurring outside the
workplace and largely unconnected to it."' 248 The court also noted that
Melzer's case, rather than solely involving speech, was a hybrid speechassociation case. 249 Citing to NTEU, its own prior decisions and
decisions from other circuits, the Second Circuit concluded that,
notwithstanding the differences between Melzer's case and most of its
prior public employee speech cases, the Pickering balancing test would
250
apply.
Applying the first step of the Pickeringtest and again citing to Justice
O'Connor's concurrence and dissent in NTEU, the Second Circuit noted
that "courts have questioned whether the public concern test is
appropriate in cases like the present one," i. e., where off-duty speech
"bear[s] no nexus to Government employment.,, 25 1 The court, however,
242. Id. (citing Melzer, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 250-52).

243. Id. at 200.
244. Id. at 192.
245. Id. at 193 (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384, 388 (1987)); see also supra note
119 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
247. Melzer, 336 F.3d at 193.
248. Id. at 194.
249. Id. at 194-95.
250. Id. at 194 and 195-96.
251. Id. at 196 (quoting NTEU, 513 U.S. at 480) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part)). Lower courts have split on the issue, with the better reasoned decisions concluding that speech
need not pertain to a matter of public concern under these circumstances. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Munger,
890 F.2d 1557, 1565 (10th Cir. 1989) ("[W]e conclude that the public concern test does not apply when
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did not resolve the issue concerning the public concern test's
applicability. 25 2 Instead, it assumed that, because a substantial portion
of Melzer and NAMBLA's speech involved advocating for change in
the law and attitudes concerning the age of consent, no matter how
distasteful to most, their speech involved matters of public concern.253
The Second Circuit went on to apply the second-step of Pickering,
i.e., the balancing test. 254 The court first delineated the government's
burden under the balancing test, stating that "the government has the
burden to show that the employee's activity is disruptive to the internal
operations of the governmental unit in question. 255 Specifically, as in
Navab-Safavi, the court noted that "[tlhe disruption must be significant
enough so that it 'impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among coworkers, has a detrimental impact on close working relationships ...or

impedes the performance of the speaker's duties or interferes with the
Regarding the public
regular operation of the enterprise.' 256
employee's side of the balancing test, the Second Circuit stated that the
content of the employee's speech is important, noting that the more the
expressive behavior pertained to matters of public concern the greater
the burden on the public employer to prove disruption.257 The Second
Circuit further pointed out that the nature of the employee's
responsibilities is also an important factor in the Pickering equation.258
Applying Pickering's second step, the Second Circuit assumed,
notwithstanding that some of NAMBLA's publications urged illegality,
that Melzer's expressive behavior was of the "highest value" and,
therefore, that the School Board had a "heavy burden" to justify

public employee nonverbal protected expression does not occur at work and is not about work."); but cf
Piscottano v. Murphy, No. 3:04CV682, 2005 WL 1424394, at *6 (D. Conn. 2005) ("Nothing in either
Roe or NTEU suggests that the Supreme Court in those cases had decided to categorically exempt 'offduty' public employee expression from the public concern requirement of Connick/Pickering."), alf'd,
511 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2007). Several scholars agree with the position taken by Justice O'Connor in
NTEU and the Tenth Circuit in Flanagan. See Panpandrea 1, supra note 148, at 2120 ("The
Connick/Pickering framework should not apply in cases involving off-duty, non-work-related
government-employee speech."); Pengtian Ma, Public Employee Speech and Public Concern: A
Critique of the US. Supreme Court's Threshold Approach to Public Employee Speech Cases, 30 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 121, 143 n.140 (1996) (advocating for elimination of the public concern threshold
generally and in off-duty speech and expressive conduct cases specifically, noting that a "'public
concern' threshold, by precluding any balancing, gives officials in charge of the employer's affairs a
free hand to take action, not to promote the employer interest in government performance, but to punish
those not in their favor.").
252. Melzer, 336 F.2d at 196.
253. Id. at 196.
254. Id. at 197-199.
255. Id. at 197, citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 150.
256. Id. (quoting Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388); see supra note 120 and accompanying text.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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Melzer's dismissal., 259 Before analyzing the Board's evidence of
disruption, the court discussed the importance of Melzer's position as a
teacher. 260 Focusing on the trust issue identified by nineteenth century
courts and, in the contemporary context, by Professor DeMitchell in
discussing teacher off-duty conduct,261 the court announced its decision
as follows:
... [W]e conduct our evaluation of appellant's rights versus

governmental interest bearing in mind his position as a teacher in a
public school. This position by its very nature requires a degree of
public trust not found in many other positions of public
employment. Although we recognize the danger in allowing the
government to take action against an employee for his off-duty
affiliations, in the context of teaching schoolchildren Melzer's
activities strike such a sensitive chord that, despite the protection
afforded his activities, the disruption they cause is great enough to
warrant the school's action against him.262
The Second Circuit also returned to the public trust issue in
discussing the reported and predicted incidents of disruption, pointing
out that
...

there is strong proof that Melzer's return to his teaching post

would compromise the learning environment, particularly because
of his effect on two critical constituencies-the students and the
parents. An expert in psychology testifying for the Board stated
that having a teacher with beliefs such as Melzer's would provoke
anxiety and be a disruptive experience for the average student. He
believed students would likely be unable to concentrate in
plaintiffs class or be uncomfortable asking him for help after class
or in any other one-on-one situation.
Melzer... acts in loco parentis for a group of students that
includes adolescent boys ....

At the same time, he advocates

changes in the law that would accommodate his professed desire to
have sexual relationships with such children. We think it is
perfectly reasonable to predict that parents will fear his influence
and predilections. Parents so concerned may remove their children
from the school, thereby interrupting the children's education,
impairing the school's reputation, and impairing educationally
desirable interdependency and cooperation among parents,
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 198.
Id.
See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text and note 160 and accompanying text.
Melzer, 336 F.3d at 198.
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teachers, and administrators.2 6 3
Having analyzed the evidence against the Pickering standard, the
Second Circuit concluded that, notwithstanding that Melzer's expressive
activities enjoyed protection under the First Amendment, the school
board had met its burden of showing264 disruption to its operation
sufficient to justify Melzer's termination.
Under the framework proposed in this Article, teacher off-duty
expressive and associational behavior which is lawful, i.e., which enjoys
First Amendment protection, should presumptively not support a claim
that a teacher is unfit to teach. In other words, such behavior should
presumptively not constitute grounds for adverse employment or
licensure action against a teacher. This presumption should arise
irrespective of whether the teacher's expressive or associational
behavior involves matters of public concern. And, the presumption
should only be rebutted in those limited circumstances where a school
district or teacher licensing board carries its heavy burden of
demonstrating a nexus between the teacher's behavior and his or her
employment as an educator. Specifically, those circumstances will only
occur where, based on fact rather than conjecture, the teacher's off-duty
expressive or associational behavior relates to the teacher's employment
such that it disrupts the educational process in a significant way under
the criteria set forth in NTEU (particularly, Justice O'Connor's
concurrence and dissent) and Roe and their progeny. By presumptively
protecting teacher expressive and associational behavior under these
circumstances, school officials and courts will properly tip the balance
in favor of teachers who engage in lawful and protected expressive
behavior which does not adversely affect legitimate school district
interests.

263. Id. at 198-99. For more in-depth discussions of the public trust issue and the in loco parentis
doctrine, see generally John E. Rumel, Back to the Future: The In Loco Parentis Doctrine and its
Impact on Whether K-12 Schools and Teachers Owe a FiduciaryDuty to Students, 46 IND. L. REv. 711
(2013); Tyler Stoehr, Comment, Letting the Legislature Decide: Why the Court's Use of In Loco
ParentisOught to be PraisedNot Condemned, 2011 BYU L. REv. 1695; Susan Stuart, In Loco Parentis
in the Public Schools: Abused, Confused and in Need of Change, 78 U. CIN. L. REv. 969, 970 (2010);
Todd A. DeMitchell, The Duty to Protect: Blackstone 's Doctrine of In Loco Parentis: A Lens for
Viewing the Sexual Abuse of Students, 2002 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 17; DeMitchell, supra note 160 and
accompanying text.
264. Melzer, 336 F.3d at 199. Before reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals also rejected
Melzer's arguments that his dismissal was caused by an impermissible "heckler's veto" and retaliation.
Id.
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B. Unlawful Off-Duty Conduct or Unprotected Speech .
1. Off-Duty Misdemeanor Conduct & Misdemeanor Speech
a. Off-Duty Misdemeanor Conduct
A teacher who engages in off-duty misdemeanor conduct should only
be subject to adverse employment or licensure action when a sufficient
nexus to teacher unfitness has been demonstrated.
Courts have issued divergent opinions in cases involving off-duty
teacher misdemeanor conduct. In Rogliano v. Fayette County Board of
Education,265 a teacher (Rogliano) was arrested and charged with
misdemeanor possession of a small amount of marijuana following a
police search of his home. 266 Based on the charges, the school board
267
tev
After the charges had been
initially suspended Rogliano without pay.
dismissed due to a technical defect on the face of the search warrant, the
superintendent recommended that the board reinstate Rogliano with
back pay. 268 The school board, however, conducted a hearing
concerning the teacher's possible dismissal, receiving unrebutted
evidence that the search had revealed that Rogliano had, in fact,
possessed marijuana. 269 After several additional proceedings, where the
court found that the evidence conclusively demonstrated that the teacher
had possessed and used marijuana, but the teacher denied that he had
done so, the board dismissed the teacher and the district court
affirmed.2 7 °
The West Virginia appellate court reversed. 271 Applying Morrison's
nexus test, the court found and concluded that, notwithstanding that
Rogliano's case had generated some level of notoriety in the
community, the lower court had erred in upholding Rogliano's dismissal
on that grounds.2 72 Specifically, the appellate court stated as follows:
We believe .. that when ... [the notoriety] factor is considered
along with the fact that the appellant was, by all accounts, an above
average teacher who was well-liked by his students, that the

265. 347 S.E.2d 220 (W.V. 1986).

266. Id. at 221-22.
267. Id. at 222.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 222-24. Although the school board never expressly charged Rogliano with violating
the West Virginia statute allowing for school boards to dismiss teachers for immorality, both the school
board and Rogliano agreed that he was discharged for alleged immorality. Id. at 224.
271. Id. at 225.
272. Id. at 221, 224-25.
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misconduct occurred in private and did not directly involve any
student or school personnel, and that he was charged only with a
misdemeanor for possession of a small amount of marijuana, the
evidence was insufficient to warrant the termination of his
employment.27 3
In contrast, in Pettit v. State Board of Education,2 74 an elementary
school teacher (Pettit) and her husband were nabbed, along with
approximately twenty other individuals, by an undercover law
enforcement officer who had infiltrated a "swinger's club" designed to
promote diverse sexual activities between consenting adults. 2 75 Pettit
was arrested and charged with violating a California criminal statute
prohibiting oral copulation, but eventually pled guilty to and was
convicted of [outrageous?] public decency, a misdemeanor.2 7 6 The State
Board of Education then initiated proceedings to revoke Pettit's teaching
credential "on the grounds (among others) that her conduct involved
moral turpitude and demonstrated her unfitness to teach., 27 7 The State
Board revoked Pettit's credential and the trial court refused to overturn
the Board's decision. 7 8
On appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed. 279

The court

distinguished its prior decision in Morrison on three grounds. 280 First,
the Court noted that, unlike in Morrison, where the unspecified sexual
conduct was not criminal in nature, Pettit's conduct involved criminal
conduct for which Pettit was convicted of a misdemeanor.2 8' Second,
while Morrison's conduct occurred in private, Pettit's conduct, having
involved a number of other participant-observers, was "semi-public. 2 82
Third, unlike in Morrison, where the Board of Education had not offered
any evidence that Morrison was unfit to teach or would advocate
improper conduct, the Board offered expert testimony that Pettit was
unfit to teach in that she might inject her personal views about sexual
mores into her conversations with students.2 83 The Court found and
concluded that, although Pettit presented evidence that her principal
273. Id. at 225; see also, e.g., Comings v. State Bd. of Educ., 100 Cal. Rptr. 73 (Cal. Ct. App.
1972) (proof that a teacher had been convicted of possession of marijuana was not evidence of his
unfitness to teach and, thus, insufficient to sustain the revocation of his teaching credential).
274. 513 P.2d 889 (1973).
275. Id. at 889-90.
276. Id. at 890.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 891.
279. Id. at 894.
280. Id. at 893-94.
281. Id. at 893-94.
282. Id. at 893.
283. Id. at 893.
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viewed Pettit as a satisfactory teacher and that Pettit's school district had
offered to rehire her,284 she could no longer serve as an exemplar to
students and the public. 285 Thus, the Court concluded that "Pettit's
illicit and indiscreet 286
actions disclosed her unfitness to teach in public
elementary schools.,

Under the framework proposed in this Article, the West Virginia high
court's decision in Rogliano properly took into account and gave some
weight to the teacher's misdemeanor conduct-possessing marijuanain determining whether the teacher was unfit to teach. The court
likewise properly discounted the significance of Rogliano's relatively
low-level criminal behavior (and the low-level of notoriety it had
generated) based on the fact that Rogliano's behavior had essentially no
nexus to his job responsibilities pertaining to his interaction with
students and other school personnel. Indeed, under the framework
proposed here, if Rogliano's off-duty possession of marijuana had
involved or occurred in the presence of students, the result would have
been different. 287
Conversely, the California Supreme Court improperly upheld the
State Board of Education's revocation of Pettit's credential. As in
Rogliano, the court properly took into account the teacher's
misdemeanor conviction as a circumstance weighing in favor of
determining her unfitness to teach. However, the court stretched in
attempting to emphasize two counterbalancing factors. First, given that
there was no evidence suggesting that Pettit would take a further step by
injecting her personal beliefs about sexual mores into her
communications with students, the court speculated when it relied on
testimony from the State Board's witnesses that Pettit was unfit to teach
284. Id. at 891.
285. Id. at 894.
286. Id.; Pettit and her husband also appeared on local television wearing facial disguises and
discussed their unconventional sexual activities. Id. at 890.
287. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed a case that pushed the edge of this
envelope a number of years after Rogliano. In Powell v. Paine, 655 S.E.2d 204 (W.V. 2007), the West
Virginia high court reversed the State Superintendent of School's order suspending the teaching license
of a teacher and coach (Powell) after he plead guilty to misdemeanor charges of domestic battery for
beating his son with a belt while disciplining the child. Id. at 206. Based on Powell's previous
unblemished record, his compliance with his criminal sentence and successful completion of a family
course, and the testimony of experts that he did not pose a risk of harm to students, the court found and
concluded that the State Superintendent had not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that
Powell was unfit to teach under the Rogliano (Morrison-derived)nexus standard. Id. at 207, 210-11. As
such, the court ordered reinstatement of Powell's teaching certificate. Id. at 205; 211. Powell was a
close case on the nexus issue. Certainly, as a general matter, it would not be unreasonable for a state
licensing official or a court to conclude that a teacher who beat his own child in anger while disciplining
him might engage in similar conduct with students at school; however, given the evidentiary record in
Powell's case, the court properly concluded that Powell did not pose a risk of replicating his misconduct
with his students at school.
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because she might do SO. 288 Second, in characterizing Pettit's behavior
as "semi-public," the Court minimized and obscured the undisputed fact
that the sexual conduct occurred in a private setting amongst consenting
adults. In this sense, Pettit's conduct, although criminal and involving
more participants and observers, was indistinguishable from the
teacher's conduct in Morrison. Because the court overstated the nexus
factors and improperly resorted to exemplar analysis, application of the
framework and analysis proposed in this Article would have led to a
different result in Pettit.
Thus, as properly illustrated by the court in Rogliano and improperly
illustrated by the court in Pettit, a teacher who engages in off-duty
misdemeanor conduct should only be subject to adverse employment or
licensure action when a sufficient nexus to teacher unfitness has been
demonstrated.28 9
b. Off-Duty Misdemeanor Speech

Similar to off-duty misdemeanor
off-duty speech or expressive or
protected by the First Amendment,
criminal sanctions, should only be

conduct, a teacher who engages in
associational behavior that is not
but is subject to only misdemeanor
subject to adverse employment or

licensure action when a sufficient nexus to teacher unfitness is
demonstrated.
Through a series of decisions over the years, the Supreme Court has
held that certain categories of speech or expressive behavior, because
their "slight social value ... is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality," 290 fall outside the protections of the First
Amendment. 29 1 Although legislatures have been reluctant to criminalize
288. Justice Tobriner, who wrote the California Supreme Court's majority opinion in Morrison,
dissented in Pettit on the grounds that all three of the Pettit majority's grounds for distinguishing
Morrison could not withstand analysis. Pettit, 513 P.2d at 895-99. As to two of those grounds, this
Article's reasoning tracks Justice Tobriner's analysis.
289. Adverse employment action by school boards against teachers who have committed
misdemeanor offenses has led to several employment discrimination cases under Title VII-with
divergent results. See Daniels v. City of Alcoa, 732 F. Supp. 1467 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) (AfricanAmerican high school band director established that racial discrimination had motivated school board's
decision to terminate him from employment after arrest for misdemeanor possession of marijuana, when
white teachers accused or convicted of misdemeanors had been given second chance); but cf Riley v.
Sch. Bd. Union Parish, 379 Fed. Appx. 335 (5th Cir. 2010) (African-American substitute teacher failed
to show that school district's stated reason for terminating her from employment was a pretext for racial
discrimination where teacher had argued that she had been terminated because of misdemeanor
marijuana possession conviction and that termination was discriminatory because two similarly situated
white teachers with criminal backgrounds were not terminated).
290. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
291. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (listing categories); R.A.V., 505 U.S.
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speech and expressive behavior because courts have struck down such
provisions as unconstitutional on free speech and liberty grounds under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
legislatures and courts have
carved out several types of speech or expressive behavior which may be
subject to criminal proscriptions and are excluded from First
Amendment protection. Certainly, some categories of unprotected
speech and expression have been subject to felony sanctions.293
However, several categories of unprotected speech are punished in a less
severe fashion. Thus, certain categories are punished as either a felony
or a misdemeanor, other categories are regulated under both the criminal
law provisions and civil penalty provisions, and at least one category is

typically no longer subject to criminal sanctions.
For example, fraudulent misrepresentation is not protected by the

First Amendment 294 and has often been proscribed by both criminal
statutes and civil penalty provisions.295 Similarly, libel (a species of
defamation)-another unprotected category of speech-is typically no

longer subject to criminal sanctions.296 And, incitement of unlawful
action, i.e., speech which is "directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and.., likely to incite or produce such action" by an

individual or a group, may be criminalized as a felony or misdemeanor
without offending the First Amendment.29 7

Only a few reported off-duty (or, for that matter, on-duty) teacher
speech cases fall into the constitutionally-unprotected categories. As to
fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation by a teacher, the one reported case
in this area involved a New Jersey court that upheld a school district's

dismissal of a teacher from employment for conduct unbecoming a
teacher after she defrauded and made false statements to a bank when
at 382-83 (same); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 819 (1975) (same).
292. See generally Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940); Thornhill v. State
of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940).
293. See infra notes 316-20 and accompanying text.
294. See generally Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612
(2003).
295. See generally Mark Zingale, Note, Fashioninga Victim Standard in Mail and Wire Fraud:
OrdinaryPrudentPerson or Monumentally Credulous Gull, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 817-18 (1999).
296. See generally Beauhamis v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). For an article chronicling the
decline of criminal libel laws, see Edward L. Carter, Outlaw Speech on the Internet: Examining the Link
Between Unique Characteristicsof Online Media and CriminalLibel Prosecutions,21 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 289, 294-97 (2005).

297. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 188 (1972) (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969) (felonious incitement); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 508, 514 (1948) (misdemeanor
incitement)). However, mere membership in a group with unlawful aims may not be criminalized
unless there is proof that the member specifically intended to accomplish the aims of the organization.
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961) (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961)).
That is why Melzer's membership in NAMBLA did not lose constitutional protection. Melzer, 336 F.3d
at 198.
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applying for a loan, but who was acquitted of criminal fraud charges
concerning the same matter. 298 In addition, although teachers have had

varying degrees of success when suing school districts and school
officials for libel related to adverse employment actions, 299 the author
was unable to locate any reported cases where teachers have been fired

by school districts for making libelous statements-criminal or
otherwise-against

school

officials or

other individuals.

And,

concerning teachers inciting imminent unlawful action, the few cases
discussing this issue have reached different conclusions concerning
whether a teachers' organization calls for imposition of "sanctions"
against its members if they do not refrain from working for or accepting
employment at an objectionable school district constitutes protected

speech or speech inciting
an illegal strike falling outside of First
3

Amendment protection. 00
Under the standard proposed in this Article, the New Jersey court, by

engaging in the moralistic thinking of the times, incorrectly upheld the
school board's dismissal of a teacher who made fraudulent statements to

a bank. Even if the teacher had been convicted of criminal charges (and
she was not), the offense-having been made off-duty and directed
toward a lending institution and not toward the school district-would
have had an insufficient nexus to the teacher's employment to warrant
her dismissal.
Conversely, if the teacher had made fraudulent
statements to the school district, a nexus would have been present and

dismissal would have been appropriate. Likewise, in those few
jurisdictions which still have criminal libel statutes, only off-duty
libelous statements by teachers that relate to their employment-such as

a defamatory statement about a school official, another teacher or even a
student-would have a sufficient nexus to the teacher's employment to
call for adverse employment or licensure action. Lastly, individual
teachers who engage in off-duty incitement of unlawful strikes against a
school district might be subject to dismissal due to the nexus between

298. Smith v. Carty, 199 A. 12, 16-17 (1938).
299. Disend v. Meadowbrook Sch., 604 N.E.2d 54 (Mass. Ct. App. 1992) (letter from school
officials to parents referring to an "incident" and commenting that teacher "was inappropriate in the way
she dealt with the children" potentially libelous); but cf Ginwright v. Unified Sch. Dist., 756 F. Supp.
1458 (D. Kan. 1991) (negative evaluations or letters of recommendations concerning teacher will not
give rise to claims for libel unless they were made with actual malice).
300. See, e. g., Bd. of Educ. of Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3 v. Nat'l Educ. Assoc., 287 N.E.2d 383
(N.Y. 1972), (reversing decision of Appellate Division enjoining imposition of sanctions based on
opinion of dissenting judge in that case); but cf Id. at 384 (Scileppi, Breitel and Jansen, JJ., dissenting)
("Advocacy directed to producing imminent illegal action, in this case an illegal strike, and likely to
produce such action, does not enjoy constitutional protection."); Bd. of Educ., Borough of Union Beach
v. New Jersey Educ. Assoc., 233 A.2d 84 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1967), aff'd, 247 A.2d 867, 874 (1968) ("It
need hardly be said that freedom of speech does not include the right to use speech as an instrument to
an unlawful end.").
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their unprotected speech and their employment and certainly would be
subject to adverse employment or licensure action if they incited
students (off-duty or on) to engage in unlawful action; however, the
above-discussed divergent decisions concerning imposition of sanctions
on school districts involved decisions by teacher unions, not individual
teachers. As such, the question of teacher off-duty unprotected speech
was not at issue in those cases.
2. Off-Duty Felonious Conduct and Speech not Directed at
Students
a. Off-Duty Felonious Conduct
A teacher who engages in off-duty felonious conduct will more likely
be subject to adverse employment or licensure action since a sufficient
nexus to teacher unfitness will more likely be shown.
Representative cases in this area come from Massachusetts. Thus, in
Dupree v. School Committee of Boston,3" 1 a junior high school teacher
(Dupree) brought an action challenging the School Committee's
decision suspending him after he was indicted for felony possession
with intent to distribute cocaine.3 °2 The trial court ruled in Dupree's
favor, holding that the crime for which Dupree had been indicted and
eventually convicted did not constitute misconduct "in office or
employment" within the meaning of the Massachusetts statute under
which Dupree had been suspended.30 3
On the School Committee's appeal, the Massachusetts appellate court
reversed.30 4 The appellate court, quoting the trial judge, first noted that
"[t]here has never been an allegation, in the indictment or otherwise,
that the plaintiff engaged in misconduct on school grounds, during work
hours, or with school personnel or students." 3 5 The court next
emphasized both the role model responsibilities of teachers and the
statutory job responsibilities assigned to teachers by the Massachusetts
legislature:
Teachers... are in a position of special public trust. As role
models for our children they have an "extensive and peculiar
opportunity to impress [their] attitude and views" upon their
pupils.... More particularly, they also have special obligations to
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

446 N.E.2d 1099 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983).
Id. at 1099-1100.
Id. at l100 &n.2.
Id. at 1100.
Id.
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their pupils as to drugs. This is so not only because of the
"frightening increase of drug use among the students,".

. .

but

because [state law] specifically requires that "instruction as to the
effects of.

.

. narcotics on the human system..

.

be given to all

pupils in all schools under public control."
In view of this statutory duty and the legitimate concern over the
use of drugs by students, we think it within the discretion of the
school committee to consider the indictment for possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute to be an "indictment for
misconduct.., in office." The school committee could reasonably
have decided that the plaintiffs alleged conduct with respect to
drugs violated a "known and significant ...duty inherent in the
obligations of his office," .. . which severely impaired his value as

a teacher and was in direct conflict "with the message his teaching
should impart.... ,,36

The appellate court concluded by again emphasizing both the
eighteenth and nineteenth century principles of morality still found in
Massachusetts statutory law and again recognizing the statutory
obligations of teachers, stating that:
In addition to [state law], which provides for instruction as to
drugs, we note that statutes from colonial days forward recognize
the unique position of teachers as examples to our youth and
charge them to "exert their best endeavors to impress on the minds
of children and youth committed to their care and instruction" the
values basic to our society.... See also [state law] ... requiring

school committees to have "full and satisfactory evidence of
[teachers'] moral character... "
This special role of teachers on impressionable and not fully
tutored minds distinguishes them from other public officials and,
we think, also informs the term "misconduct in office" as applied
to teachers. For this reason, and because of the specific statutory
duty of drug education imposed on schools in [state statutory law],
we view an indictment of a teacher for a drug felony to be
sufficiently different from the circumstances in [a police officer
suspension case].

...

307

Similarly, in Perryman v. School Committee of Boston,30 8 the School
Committee suspended two teachers after they had been indicted on
306. Id. at 1101.
307. Id.
308. 458 N.E.2d 748 (Mass. Ct. App. 1983).
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The trial court reversed the School
welfare fraud charges. 30 9
case was pending
Committee's decision, but noted that the
310 Dupree
before the Massachusetts appellate court.
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision in
Perryman, relying on its recently-decided opinion in Dupree.3 11 The
court first noted that, in order to suspend a teacher for felonious conduct
under Massachusetts law, "a direct relationship between the misconduct
and the office must exist. .... ,,3 2 The court went on to indicate that
"[t]eachers are not required to comport themselves in a manner
approved by all segments of a community in order to meet the
obligations of their office., 3 13 However, the appellate court, applying
Dupree and reiterating its emphasis about teachers holding positions of
special trust, upheld the school committee's suspension of the two
teachers.314 In so holding, the appellate court stated as follows:
Although the allegations against the teachers-lying and stealingdo not conflict with an expression of duty such as that found
impressive ... in Dupree, they nonetheless conflict with the
obligations imposed on teachers by [state statutory law] ... which

can be collectively described as requiring teachers to be of such
"moral character" as to be able to instruct students on the basic
values of our society.
We are aware that these statutes may be too abstract for
consideration in certain circumstances (especially those connected
to the expression of thought) and that it sometimes may be difficult
to draw the line between misconduct and misconduct in office.
Such is not the case here.
The teachers' alleged conduct directly contradicts the most
fundamental values which all segments of our society expect
teachers to inculcate in the children entrusted to them.
As it relates to a teacher's position of special public trust, we do not
view lying to and stealing from the public as so significantly
different from possession of cocaine with intent to distribute as to
allow us to reason that the former is simply misconduct whereas
the latter is misconduct in office. Accordingly, we conclude that
the indictments allege conduct so inimical to the obligations
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

749.
750-51.
749.
750.
750-51.
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imposed by reason of a teacher's position of special public trust
that Dupree controls.3 15
The Dupree and Perryman courts reached decisions consistent with
the framework proposed in this Article by requiring a nexus between the
teachers' off-duty felonious conduct and their job responsibilities.
Indeed, the courts' insistence that the teachers' conduct directly relate to
their statutory duties constituted a laudable effort to further objectify the
nexus standard. Likewise, the Perryman court's observation that
teachers "are not required to comport themselves in a manner approved
by all segments of a community" to satisfy their job responsibilities is
consistent with this Article's attempt to make more objective the
standard for evaluating teacher off-duty conduct. Yet, to truly comport
with the proposed framework, the Massachusetts court should have
emphasized the teachers' felony violations in both cases. By so doing,
the courts would have focused on positive law enacted by the
Massachusetts legislature, i.e., criminal law provisions which
unequivocally reflected a readily-ascertainable baseline for the
community standard for morality in that state. That focus, plus the
courts' insistence on adherence to nexus analysis, would have tracked
the standard for analyzing felonious conduct committed by teachers
suggested by this Article. Instead, however, the courts fell back on
traditional role model and morality standards which, in future cases,
may invite decisionmakers to evaluate teacher off-duty conduct based
on "the comporting in a manner with all segments of the community"
thinking that the Perryman court had earlier decried.
b.

Unlawful Felonious Speech not Directedat Students

Much like teacher felonious conduct, teacher felonious expressive or
associational behavior will have a sufficient nexus to teacher fitness and
will generally constitute a sufficient basis for adverse employment or
licensure action.
As a general matter, legislatures have been reluctant to criminalize
speech, expressive conduct, and associational behavior because courts
have frequently struck down such provisions as unconstitutional on the
grounds that they impermissibly limit the right to liberty under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. 316 These concerns notwithstanding,
legislatures and courts have carved out several types of speech or
expressive conduct which may be subject to felony criminal

315. Id. at 751.
316. See Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940); Thornhill v. State of
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940).
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proscriptions and are excluded from First Amendment protection. For
example, obscene speech receives no protection under the First
Amendment. 3 17 Also, fighting words, i.e. face-to-face speech which is
likely to provoke an immediate breach of peace by the recipient, are
likewise not constitutionally protected.3 18 Likewise, true threats fall
outside the First Amendment. 3 19 Thus, "statements where the speaker
means to communicate a serious expression of... intent to commit an
act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of
individuals" do not receive First Amendment protection.3 2 °
Only a few reported off-duty (or, for that matter, on-duty) teacher
speech cases fall into the criminalized, constitutionally-unprotected
categories. As to obscenity-caused dismissals, as discussed previously,
the only case squarely discussing the matter-Waters-involved a nonteacher public employee who used non-erotic obscene language in
griping at an off-duty setting about work in a private conversation. 3 2'
The court there properly concluded that the speech was constitutionally
protected.322 As to fighting words and true threats, in White v. South
Park Independent School District, the Fifth Circuit correctly upheld a
school district's dismissal of a teacher and coach against a First
Amendment challenge when it was undisputed that the educator had
threatened to kill the school district's athletic director.3 23 The Court of

Appeals relied on Supreme Court authorities discussing both the
317. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485
(1957). Ironically, given earlier discussions in this Article concerning morality and local community
standards and their role in evaluating teacher fitness, the Supreme Court has held that courts should
determine whether speech is obscene by referencing "contemporary community standards." Miller, 413
U.S. at 24. In Miller, the Court rejected the use of a national standard to determine obscenity, Id. at 30,
but did "not state what geographic standard a jury must apply .. " Scott A. Duval, A Callfor Obscenity
Law Reform, I WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75, 79 (1992). In addition, the Supreme Court,
distinguishing Roth, has made clear that non-erotic uses of otherwise obscene expression do not lose
their First Amendment protection. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). In a similar vein, lower
courts have held that public employees have a right to use otherwise obscene language as part of their
First Amendment "right to gripe" in private, off-duty conversations as long as such conversations do not
adversely affect their relations in the workplace. See, e.g., Waters v. Chaffin, 684 F.2d 833, 834, 83740 (11 th Cir. 1982).
318. Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1941).
319. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); Watt v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708
(1969).
320. Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
321. See Duval, supra note 317; see also Waters v. Chaffin, 684 F.2d 833, 834, 837-40 (11th Cir.
1982).
322. Duval, supra note 317. Also, although public employee expression that is sexually explicit,
but not obscene and not involving children, falls within the ambit of the First Amendment, Roe v. City of
San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd on other grounds, City of San Diego v. Roe, 543
U.S. 77 (2004); Flanaganv. Munger, 890 F.2d 157, 1560, 1560 n.2, 1565 (1989); Waters, 684 F.2d at
838 n. 11, obscene speech of public employees does not. Am. Postal Workers Union v. U. S. Postal
Serv., 595 F. Supp. 403,406 n. 2 (D. Conn. 1984) (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 147).
323. 693 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1982).
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fighting words doctrine and the true threat doctrine; 324 however, the
district court's findings in the case, supported by the evidence, that the
teacher had repeatedly threatened to kill the athletic director and was
serious about carrying the threats out, but that the threats were never
made personally to the athletic director, suggest that the case should
have been disposed of solely as a true threat case.32 5 Also, in Smith v.
New York City Department of Education,326 a teacher made true threats
to kill the arbitrator presiding over the teacher's initial termination
proceeding.327 After the first arbitrator recused himself, the second
arbitrator recommended that the Department of Education terminate the
teacher based on his threats.32 8
The Department adopted the
recommendation and terminated the teacher.3 29 When the teacher filed
an action to set aside the arbitration award, the trial court granted the
Department's motion to dismiss the action and the appellate court
affirmed.3 3 °
In sum, the few courts addressing teacher termination matters in the
off-duty felonious expressive behavior context have correctly upheld the
teachers' dismissals where there was a nexus between the teachers'
speech and their employment relations.
3.

Off-Duty Conduct and Speech Exploitive of Students
a. Off-Duty Conduct Exploitative of Students

Just as a teacher should enjoy a strong presumption of fitness when he
or she engages in lawful off-duty conduct unrelated to students, a
teacher should face a strong presumption of unfitness when he or she
engages in off-duty conduct which sexually exploits children.
The Colorado Supreme Court has said it best-albeit in genderspecific language. Thus, in cases where male teachers engaged in
sexual provocative or romantic conduct such as kissing or touching
female students either while off-duty or while supervising students on a
field trip, the Colorado high court stated that "whenever a male teacher
engages in sexually provocative or exploitative conduct with his minor

324. Id. at 1168 n.8 (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568; Watts, 394 U.S. at705).
325. Id.at1165, 1169.
326. 109 A.D. 3d 701, 701-03 (S.Ct. App. Div. 2013).
327. Id. at 701-02.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.; see also State v. Chung, 862 P.2d 1063, 1073 (Haw. S.Ct. 1993) (where teacher made
true threats against a building principal, court in criminal proceeding held that teacher's threatening
statements were not protected under the First Amendment).
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female students, a strong presumption of unfitness arises against the
teacher." 331 Of course, this strong presumption of unfitness should arise
when such conduct occurs between female teachers and male students
and, indeed, between any teacher and any student irrespective of their

gender. 332
In sum, under the framework proposed in this Article, a strong
presumption of unfitness should arise when a teacher engages in
sexually exploitive conduct directed at students. That presumption
should only be rebutted in extremely limited instances. Those instances
should arise, if at all, only where the teacher is able to demonstrate that
his or her conduct occurred under circumstances which give rise to a
legal excuse, such as coercion, duress, mental incapacity, involuntary
intoxication or the like.
b. Off-Duty Speech Exploitive of Students
The same strong presumption of unfitness concerning off-duty
teacher speech exploitive of students should attach when a teacher
engages in expressive behavior exploitive of students.
In the above-discussed Colorado Supreme Court decisions, the
teachers' behavior involved, among other things, vulgar and suggestive
speech (both off-campus and on) laden with sexual innuendo.3 33
Beyond those cases, the author was unable to locate any additional
reported decisions discussing adverse employment or licensure
consequences concerning off-duty teacher speech directed at or
exploitive of students.
However, under the framework proposed in this Article, teacher offduty speech directed at or exploitative of children-including,
especially, unprotected or marginally protected speech such as
obscenity, pornography, fighting words, true threats, or incitementshould be presumptively grounds for adverse employment or licensure
Again, as with exploitive conduct, the
action against teachers.
presumption should only be rebuttable in extremely limited
circumstances.

331. Ricci v. Davis, 627 P.2d 1111, 1120 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (quoting Weissman v. Bd. of
Educ., 547 P.2d 1267, 1273 (Colo. 1976)); see also supra note 174.
332. See Stephanie S. Reed, Note and Comment, Bad Bad Teacher!: How Judicial Lenience,
Cultural Ignorance, and Media Hype Have Inevitably Lead to Lighter Sentences, Underreportingand
Glamorizationof Female Sex Offender, 11 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 353 (2012).
333. Weissman, 547 P.2d at 1270; Ricci, 627 P.2d at 1120 n.8.
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4. Off-Duty Felonious Conduct and Speech Causing Serious Harm
to Students
a. Off-Duty Conduct CausingSerious Injury to Students

When a teacher engages in felonious off-duty conduct exploiting
children that results in a criminal conviction, that conduct should render
a teacher per se unfit to teach and should constitute sufficient grounds
for permanent adverse employment and licensure action against him or
her where the legislature has so indicated.
A number of state legislatures have followed this approach, enacting
statutes requiring the automatic or permanent revocation of a teaching
license or certificate when a teacher has been convicted of or pleads no
lo contendre to a felony offense involving serious injury, often of a
sexual nature, to a child.33 4 Interpreting California's statutory provisions
concerning teacher credential revocation, a California appellate court
has stated that "a teacher whose credential is being investigated for
possible adverse action is per se unfit to teach only when the teacher has
been convicted of a crime which the Legislature has declared requires
the imposition of automatic sanctions on that teacher's credentials. 335
By codifying a permanent revocation sanction for teacher off-duty
conduct where the teacher has been convicted of a serious felony against
a child, a state legislature will have set the community standard for
morality. Under these circumstances, a nexus between the conduct and
teacher unfitness will have been established per se, or stated another
way, irrebuttably presumed. As such, no further showing beyond the
fact of the conviction would be required. Thus, unlike in Morrison, and
unlike other criminal convictions involving off-duty contact, a teacher's
conviction for a serious felony causing injury to a child, where the
legislature has mandated permanent revocation of the teacher's teaching
certificate, will have "talismanic significance.' 3 36
b.

Off-Duty Speech CausingSerious Injury to Children

Felonious off-duty teacher speech or expressive sexual behavior
334. See, e.g., California Education Code Sections 44420 and 44424, discussed in Rebecca
Rabovsky, Chapter 578: Reducing the Discretion of the California Commission on Teacher
Credentialing,McGEORGE L. REV. 344, 346 (2009). See also IDAHO CODE § 33-1208(2)(a-n) (2014)
(listing serious felony offenses against children, conviction of which requires permanent denial or
revocation of a teaching certificate); Ind. Code § 20-28-5-8 (c)(1-31) (2014) (same); ARIZ. REVL STAT.
§ 15-550(B) (2014) (same).
335. Broney v. Cal. Comm'n on Teacher Credentialing, 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 832, 834 (Cal. Ct. App.
2010); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Jack M., 139 Cal. Rptr. 700, 701 (Cal. 1977).
336. Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 377 n.4 (1969).
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exploiting or causing serious injury to children should likewise render a
teacher both per se and permanently unfit to teach.
In this regard, possession or distribution of child pornography is
criminalized in essentially every jurisdiction and is not protected under
the First Amendment.337 Not surprisingly, the few cases involving
teachers possessing or distributing child pornography have resulted in
the teacher resigning 338
from employment prior to completion of felony
criminal proceedings.
Thus, like felonious off-duty teacher sexual conduct involving
exploitation of or serious injury to children, felonious off-duty teacher
speech or expressive behavior leading to the same exploitation or injury
should result in the same per se and permanent exclusion from the
teaching profession.
V. CONCLUSION

The nexus standard adopted by contemporary courts in evaluating offduty teacher conduct and speech in the employment and licensure
context has constituted an appropriate development in the evolution of
K-12 education law. Yet, as discussed in this Article, the nexus
standard, although helpful to the proper resolution of a range of off-duty
teacher conduct and speech cases, still suffers from deficiencies related
to the subjectivity inherent in the community standard, morality,
notoriety, and role model/exemplar principles that the nexus standard
was designed to address. For these reasons, this Article has proposed a
framework for analyzing off-duty teacher conduct-a framework which
categorizes the nature of teacher off-duty conduct and expressive
behavior through the prism of the positive law-that will bring more
objectiveness to the analysis of those cases in the employment and
licensure settings. Recognizing that certain cases will remain hard cases
under any standard, judicial adoption of the proposed framework would
augment the nexus standard and properly protect teachers' off-duty
conduct and associational and speech rights, while still providing school
boards and teacher licensing boards sufficient authority to take adverse
action against teachers where their off-duty behavior makes them unfit
to teach.

337. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763--64 (1982).
338. See, e.g., Gamey v. Mass. Teachers' Retirement Sys., 14 N.E.3d 922, 925 (Mass. 2014).

